2. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Pakistan-Indian Relations


  • The Secretary
  • His Excellency G. Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
  • M. Masood, Minister of Pakistan
  • M. Jafri, First Secretary of Embassy
  • Mr. Talbot, Assistant Secretary for NEA
  • Mr. Naas, SOA
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Integration of Kashmir Ambassador

Ahmed called on the Secretary under instructions to express the concern of the GOP over Indian actions to integrate Kashmir into India. The Ambassador reviewed briefly the proposals made by former Prime Minister Bakshi in October 1963,2 the subsequent discussion in early October between Under Secretary Ball and Foreign Minister Bhutto,3 and Pakistan’s protests to India and its letters to the Security Council. The Ambassador stated that the GOP was particularly disturbed by the November 27, 1963 debate in the Lok Sabha over the integration of Kashmir. Although the GOI has decided not to repeal Article 3704 at this time, integration is proceeding apace. Continued steps toward complete integration could create a serious situation in the area and he hoped the U.S. could intercede in some way.

Mr. Talbot told the Ambassador that we have made it perfectly clear to the GOI that the U.S. position was governed by the January 24, 1957 U.N. resolution.5 The Ambassador remarked that it was only a small comfort to Pakistan to know that other nations did not recognize India’s actions; integration was nevertheless taking place and India was consolidating its position in Kashmir.

The Ambassador said that overall Indo-Pak relations were bad. At the recent Jaipur meeting of the Congress Party a resolution was passed which linked the Chinese Communists and Pakistan, charging that they were committing aggression against India. He quoted GOI Minister Subramaniam as stating that the GOI was taking steps to contain and to vacate this aggression. If these words are applied to Kashmir, he said, they are very ominous.

The Secretary inquired whether there might be any benefit from informal, unofficial talks between knowledgeable Indians and Pakistanis on the problems besetting the two nations. Such talks might be one step toward improving relations. The Ambassador expressed doubt that talks of this nature could be fruitful; they would not carry much weight with either government.

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The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador had read Chairman Khrushchev’s “peace proposals”6 carefully, and whether the Ambassador saw in them any indication of possible changes in the Soviet position on Kashmir. He noted that we were examining the statement from many different vantage points; frankly, he said, we do not yet know whether the document is primarily propagandistic but it deserves careful attention. The Ambassador replied that he had not thoroughly studied Khrushchev’s paper, but he had not seen any indication in it of a change in Soviet policy on Kashmir.

U.S. Military Aid to India; ChiCom Intentions

The Ambassador stated that it appeared to him that the “regional military situation” in South Asia had changed somewhat in the last few months. He said it was fairly clear that the Chinese did not intend to attack India; in fact, it appeared that the Chinese were moving some of their forces to the Sinkiang border area. President Ayub’s assessment of the Chinese threat had proved correct, he said. In view of the changed situation, the Ambassador asked, is there any possibility the U.S. might review its policy with respect to arms aid for India. The Secretary stated that our position had not changed since General Taylor had talked with President Ayub. He agreed, on the basis of his own experience in the area in World War II, that an invasion of the subcontinent from the north was not in the cards. It also appeared, he added, that the Chinese may refrain from military efforts of any kind against India in the near future. The Chinese, however, had the capacity in place to take limited actions. More importantly, the Secretary said, we have seen no changes in the basic attitude of the Chinese Communists. They were violating the Geneva accord, sponsoring terrorism in Latin America, had refused to sign the Test Ban Treaty, were stepping up the war in Viet Nam by supplying large quantities of Chinese materiel (recently 7 tons of Chinese equipment were captured in the Delta), and were continuing to take the same belligerent line in the Moscow-Peiping dispute. In sum, he said, we see no evidence that the Chinese want to live in peace with their neighbors. We believe it is definitely possible that in the months ahead the Chinese will provoke further trouble somewhere along their perimeter.

In closing, the Secretary stated that he would discuss with his colleagues the matters raised by the Ambassador and would talk to him again.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Charles W. Naas on January 9 and approved in S on January 19.
  2. On October 3, 1963, G.M. Bakshi, outgoing Prime Minister of Kashmir, announced to the legislature of Kashmir a number of proposed constitutional changes designed to further the integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union. The United States expressed deep concern to the Indian Government over Bakshi’s announcement, which was viewed as likely to complicate the task of promoting a climate in which progress could be made toward reducing tensions on the subcontinent. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIX, Document 344.
  3. See ibid., Document 332.
  4. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution outlined the relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Union.
  5. UN doc. S/3779, printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 11, 1957, p. 232.
  6. Reference is to a letter sent by Khrushchev to various Heads of State on December 31, 1963, concerning the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. For text of the letter, as received in Washington, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 938–940.