Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, October 10, 1963, 8:56 p.m.

309. Following are highlights of discussions held in Washington October 3-6 between Foreign Minister Bhutto and the President, Under Secretary Ball and Governor Harriman:¹

1. From the start we sought to avoid repetition of arguments on both sides as presented at Rawalpindi. Bhutto accepted this approach in principle.

2. We made clear we had carefully considered all points made by GOP leaders at Rawalpindi about India’s alleged threat to Pakistan and our military aid to India, but that we would proceed with a limited, selective military aid program for India tailored to meet the Chicom threat. Underlined our policy to help countries standing up to Chicoms.

3. We stated that we accept as a political fact that Pakistan’s fear of India is genuine, whatever we think about the justification of that fear, and suggested that Pakistan accept as a political fact our decision to help India within the limits of our assessment of what is required to meet the Chicom threat.

4. Bhutto replied that he could accept these two “political facts of life” as a basis for discussion, though this did not mean that he accepted validity of the proposition that U.S. military aid to India should continue.

5. Discussions proceeded on this basis with initiative left to Bhutto to indicate, within framework of these political facts, what Pakistan wished from us. Ensuing conversations on this basis were inconclusive, and throughout the discussions we received impression Bhutto was without instructions to commit GOP to any new position on major subjects raised, though in course of one informal luncheon conversation with Harriman he made a remark which could be construed as hinting at more MAP for Pakistan as an offset to Indian program.

6. We also expressed our strong concern at recent evidences of a continuation of Pakistan’s policy of “normalizing” its relations with Communist China. We pointed out that Pakistan’s reply to Chou En-lai’s letter proposing a nuclear disarmament conference, and the sending of an official delegation to the Chicom national day celebrations, for instance, caused extremely adverse reactions in the US, encouraged the Chicoms in their objectives, hardened India’s stand in Kashmir, and pulled rug from under more conciliatory elements in India.

7. Bhutto attempted to justify Pakistan’s steps toward “normalization” as intrinsically minor matters, on which Pakistan could be trusted not to go too far, and tried to defer any further discussion of this matter.

8. We found, however, that Bhutto continued to question the necessity for more aid to India. Thus, some of the discussion covered familiar ground on both sides. For instance, Bhutto again made the suggestion, which the President rejected as self-defeating, that the US should use the leverage of its military aid to India to induce the GOI to settle the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Bhutto also expressed strong indignation at recent Indian moves designed to integrate Kashmir into India and concern at American aid for rebuilding the road from Srinagar to Leh.

9. The President suggested that it might be useful for General Taylor to go to Pakistan to examine with Pakistan military leaders the measures which we could take that might tend to reassure Pakistan about our support in the event of an attack on it by India. Bhutto welcomed this suggestion and we anticipate that General Taylor will visit Pakistan following the CENTO Military Committee meeting in Ankara November 5-6. Possibility also raised that McNamara might visit Pakistan with Taylor, although this not firmed up. Bhutto later informally suggested that Ball also come with these officers. Latter possibility only a Pak suggestion and we do not intend to act upon it now.

For London

While you may draw on above for discussions with CRO, suggest you also state Assistant Secretary Talbot will of course provide more details during his stay in London October 9 to 11.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-INDIA. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted in SOA by Harold G. Josif; cleared with BNA, and by Cameron, Grant, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Ball. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
1. Memoranda of Bhutto’s conversations with Ball and Harriman are ibid., POLPAK-US. A memorandum of Bhutto’s conversation with Kennedy on October 4 is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 10/63. Bhutto discussed many of the concerns that he raised in Washington in a conversation with Rusk in New York on September 28. (Secto 24 from USUN, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, POLPAK-US)