Office of the Historian

192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1

Washington, September 8, 1965, 1:57 p.m.

383. Personal for the Ambassador from the Secretary. As seen from here there are very urgent reasons why we should attempt to prevent Indo-Pak fighting from expanding into the Bengal-East Pakistan area. Quite apart from strong humanitarian reasons for not extending ground and air operations in area of massed populations, the military situation in the West still appears to be somewhat tentative and possibilities of getting cease-fire and pullback still exist. Opening up of front in the Eastern subcontinent would be further major inflammation and would substantially increase risks of Chinese involvement. Surely, given threatening noises out of Peiping,2 Indian authorities can see the point of conserving their resources in the East to meet a possible Chinese move rather than catch up East Pakistan in the step by step escalation which becomes increasingly difficult for either of two governments or the UN to control. Further factor is our own national interest against spreading of fighting into areas in which reasonable care of foreign residents will be extremely difficult. Unless you see strong objections, in which case we would wish your prompt comments, you are authorized to take this matter up urgently with highest Indian authorities. If they are responsive, we would make immediate and similar approach to Pakistan to get their agreement not to expand the violence into the East. You should make it clear that this is in no sense an endorsement by us of the validity of the fighting in the West and that this is without prejudice to our full support of UN SYG. But if both countries are to avoid a catastrophe some restraint must begin to enter the picture and, [Page 371] given the menacing threats from Peiping, peace in the East is at least a beginning.3

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by Talbot and Bundy, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi.↩
  2. On September 8 China sent a note to India protesting serious violations of Chinese territory by Indian troops and warning that if the violations did not cease, “India must bear responsibility for all consequences arising therefrom.” (Telegram 573 from New Delhi, September 11; ibid.) In Washington, the Chinese threat was taken seriously. Komer wrote a memorandum on September 8 entitled “US Policy at the Crossroads in the Subcontinent” in which he concluded that if China became militarily involved in the war between India and Pakistan, the United States would have little choice other than to become similarly involved since “the whole Western power position in Asia may be at stake.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Agenda Points, 9/17/65)↩
  3. Bowles responded on September 9 that he agreed with Rusk’s message and instructed his staff to make the points with senior members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. He did not feel the issue needed to be pressed at the highest levels of the government since Defense Minister Chavan had just made a statement in the Indian Parliament indicating that India had no plans to escalate the war into East Pakistan. (Telegram 541 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK) Ambassador McConaughy reported in telegram 459 from Karachi, September 12, that he delivered a note to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry expressing U.S. concern that every effort be made to avoid expanding the war into East Pakistan. (Ibid.)↩