191. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1
Pak/Indian Roundup. The military situation remains confused. Apparently the Paks have held the Indian thrust into the Punjab. An Indian thrust into East Pakistan seems imminent, if not underway.2 Neither party shows any signs of response to cease-fire appeals as yet.
The Chicoms have announced “firm support” of Pakistan, but there are no signs yet that this means more than words. The USSR has come out strongly in favor of the UN cease-fire appeal.
[Page 369]U Thant leaves this evening. We’ve offered him logistic support, including use of our Attaché aircraft for travel around the area and planes to bring in more UN observers if needed.
Attached are two cables (Delhi 5033 and Karachi 3984) which give important insights into the current mood of both parties. Our announcement of aid suspension tomorrow will lead to howls from both, but it should also help bring home to them the consequences of their folly.
When UK High Commissioner James saw Ayub today, the latter was apparently now more fully aware of the mess he’s in. We infer this from Ayub’s willingness to accept Pearson5 as mediator. James felt it was not the time to bring up how we were unlikely to pledge.
Shastri has just written you a letter, which BK Nehru asks to deliver personally. We don’t know the contents but suspect it is a defense of India’s position.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14, 7/1/65–9/22/65. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.↩
- Intelligence reports as of September 6 indicated a build-up of Indian forces all along the border with East Pakistan. (White House telegram CAP 65565 to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, September 7; ibid., Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65–9/65)↩
- In telegram 503 from New Delhi, September 7, Bowles reported on a conversation that morning with L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister. He asked Jha if the situation was beyond recovery or if diplomatic efforts might yet prevent full-blown war. Jha responded that a cease-fire was possible if the Pakistani infiltrators were removed from Kashmir, if the cease-fire line and the UN apparatus to enforce it were revamped to avoid further violations, and if Pakistan agreed to take the pressure off the Kashmir issue until an atmosphere could be reestablished in which reasonable negotiations were possible. Jha also noted that after the border war with China in 1962 and subsequent Chinese and Pakistani propaganda about the fighting qualities of the Indian army, Shastri was determined in the present conflict to establish India as a nation of vitality, purpose, and strength. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK)↩
- Telegram 398 from Karachi, September 7, reported on a message from Finance Minister Shoaib, which McConaughy felt merited high-level consideration. Shoaib noted that Bhutto had arranged the call upon the United States to fulfill its pledges to Pakistan knowing that it would not be able to respond in a clear and conclusive manner. The war therefore offered the opportunity in Bhutto’s words to “silence once and for all the American party.” Shoaib worried that attacks on the United States would increase and the misunderstanding between the two countries would grow. He asked for some gesture of U.S. support to offset the negative atmosphere building in Pakistan, preferably a statement that the United States intended to make the scheduled consortium pledge. (Ibid., POL PAK-US)↩
- Lester Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada.↩