184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
284. For Ambassador from Secretary. The following are your instructions for your meeting with Ayub on Monday.2 They are framed in the light of our information from the British that the Paks apparently still think we will go ahead and pledge on 23 September.
- 1.
- You should say you are speaking under instructions.
- 2.
- Paks will notice we have so far refrained from public apportionment of blame in current Kashmir crisis. But whatever the merits of Kashmir dispute itself, US cannot condone attempt to compel its settlement by use of force.
- 3.
- Therefore, US strongly supports SYG’s appeal for cease-fire and will of course have to take whatever steps are indicated to support him.
- 4.
- For example, Paks should have been well aware—from Rann of Kutch episode—of spot in which US placed by Pak use of MAP equipment provided as part of defensive anti-communist alliance and not for purposes of local wars among neighbors. So we hope Pakistan will understand our problem and act in accordance with our agreement.
- 5.
- The violent Pak reaction to what began as a simple US request for two month postponement of our aid pledge was deeply regrettable. It was inconsistent with the mutual respect expected among allies, and the continued massive flow of US aid. Its predictable effect was to surface all the basic concerns about US/Pak relations which were growing in minds of people of America.
- 6.
- We see little point in a sterile debate over who is the “aggrieved” party. The US feels it has nothing to apologize for. We have consistently given Pakistan highly preferential treatment over far larger India in the allocation of our aid. Even after the apparent community of interest between Pakistan and the US began declining, we continued and even increased such assistance in the hope that matters could be sorted out.
- 7.
- But current situation has persuaded President there must be a basic examination of Pak/US relations. The President believes these fundamental issues can and must be thrashed out only between the two key people and feels that until this can be arranged US will not [Page 358] attempt to take any far-reaching decisions on bilateral matters (if Ayub asks whether this means no pledge, you should answer that you simply don’t know but that that is the way you would interpret it yourself). The President believes that a mutually beneficial relationship would likely grow out of this meeting.
- 8.
- Meanwhile, we appeal to Ayub’s statesmanship not to risk Pakistan’s future on a set of risky gambles which could easily prove disastrous. We see Pakistan at a major crossroads. It will determine for itself the future course of its policy. We naturally hope it will remain basically disposed toward US, and the President hopes to discuss this whole matter personally with Ayub. However, we do not feel able to act as if nothing has happened until the basic issues have been discussed at summit.
Finally, you should inform Ayub that early this week the US Government will be forced by American public opinion to state whether it is continuing military supplies to countries which have not accepted UN appeal for cease-fire. You should make it clear that when this question is posed the US will have to answer that no military assistance is being supplied to any such country. You should say that you do not know just when or how this statement will become necessary, but that our Government has asked you to give this private notice in advance that such a statement is sure to be necessary soon unless there is a very prompt and affirmative response to the UN appeal. You should not respond to any question from Ayub as to whether this same message is going to India, on which you are “without instructions”.
For London: Please inform CRO substance this instruction.