Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, September 2, 1965, 6:58 p.m.

266. From the Secretary. Situation Kashmir has now clearly reached point of major Pak-Indian military confrontation, involving use of U.S. MAP equipment. It therefore urgent both Karachi and Delhi reiterate our very strong concern to highest appropriate authorities, coordinating closely with British. At this immediate point, however, we do not believe we should make any demarche to either side as to what we might have to do if fighting escalates but rather restrict our position essentially to full support for efforts UNSYG. What we do in future will depend on variety factors, especially situation as we see it after two parties have indicated nature their response SYG’s appeal.

Your approach should therefore rest on following points:

1. We are seriously concerned that situation which has developed in Kashmir will lead to major war between India and Pakistan.

2. We have given our full support to UNSYG’s appeal of September 1 and have urged full, sympathetic and prompt response by both parties.

3. We could only view any further escalation of hostilities by either side in light UNSYG’s appeal as seriously prejudicial to peaceful settlement.

4. We are speaking equally strongly to both GOI and GOP about complying with SYG’s appeal.

For Delhi: Above responds your 458.² Re Para C your 444,³ we consider we have given to GOI and GOP sufficient assurances for dealing with Communist attack and do not expect nor wish to reiterate them in present circumstances.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Laise; cleared by Talbot, Captain Asbury Coward, USN, in G/PM, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William E. Lang, Sisco, Mann, and Komer; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to New Delhi as telegram 327, and repeated to USUN, London, Bonn for the Under Secretary, Ankara, and Tehran.
2. In telegram 458 from New Delhi, September 2, Bowles urgently suggested the need for direct U.S. pressure on both sides to respond to the Secretary-General’s appeal. If India accepted the appeal for a cease-fire and Pakistan did not, Bowles requested authority to tell Shastri that the United States would promptly cut off all military assistance to Pakistan. (Ibid.) Bowles was informed, in telegram 330 to New Delhi, September 2, that a decision had been taken at the highest level not to engage in direct pressure on either India or Pakistan for the time being, but to place primary reliance on the United Nations. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 444 from New Delhi is summarized in footnote 2, Document 177. In paragraph C, Bowles urged that both parties to the conflict should be informed that should either side be attacked by a Communist country, the United States would use all available constitutional powers to come to the defense of the side attacked.