178. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with the President on Kashmir, 2 September 1965, 9:30 am
PRESENT
- The President
- Secretary Rusk
- Mr. Talbot
- Mr. Sisco
- Mr. Handley
- Secretary Vance
- General Taylor
- General Wheeler
- Admiral Raborn
- Mr. Cline
- Mr. McG. Bundy
- Mr. Moyers
- Mr. Komer
Secretary Rusk described how Kashmir could erupt into a major fracas; perhaps the most serious problem could be communal rioting; there was a risk that millions could be killed. So every effort must be made to stop the fighting. The Pakistanis had started the current affair with a massive infiltration of several thousand men. Then the Indians crossed the CFL in a mop-up operation, especially to pinch off a dangerous salient. Now the Paks had escalated by throwing in their regular army in an apparent attempt to cut the road to Srinagar.
The Secretary saw the key as being to restore the CFL, including against Pak infiltration. Yesterday we thought direct US intervention and threat of MAP suspension might be necessary. Now U Thant had issued an appeal,2 so we’d put out a strong supporting statement. The Secretary had talked to the Paks and Indians. Our next step depended on the answer to the SYG’s appeal. For example, if one side said yes and the other no, a new situation would be created. So Secretary Rusk [Page 346] proposed a more limited démarche than yesterday, principally asking the Paks about their use of US equipment. In response to the President’s query he indicated that the UK plans to put out a statement this morning.
The President wanted to be very cautious about anything we said. First, both sides wanted us to threaten them so they could be martyrs. Second, both would use US equipment if they needed it, regardless of what we said. So the President wanted to get someone else in—as in PM Wilson’s last intervention. We should “get behind a log and sleep a bit.” The President said he had found out over the last few months how little influence we had with the Paks or Indians. We had never threatened them, but they kept saying so. Thus the President’s view was to let the SYG do it or let PM Wilson do it. The President did not want to intervene personally. He’d like to sit it out a little bit. The President questioned Paragraph 4 of the draft telegram3 before him. Wasn’t this a subtle threat?
Secretary Rusk felt our own position was involved on the issue of the use of MAP-supplied arms. We’d told both the Indians and Paks that our equipment was not for this purpose. So we were on a spot.
When the President asked when the pledging session was, Bundy told him 23 September, but pointed out that it was likely to be overshadowed by Kashmir. At some point we’d have to say we were not the quartermasters for two armies fighting each other.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that once Pak use of US equipment was confirmed we’d begin getting strong Indian complaints.
The President repeated that we should confine ourselves to supporting the UN. We should “hide behind that log.” He disapproved of Paras. 3 and 4 and the first sentence of Para. 5 in the draft telegram4 before him. He also desired that we tell the Paks we intended to speak equally strongly to the Indians.
The meeting then took up Dominican Republic items.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Kashmir, Vol. II, 9/65–10/65. Secret. Prepared by Komer.↩
- On September 1, UN Secretary-General U Thant issued an appeal to President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri for an immediate cease-fire in the conflict. U Thant offered his services in helping to reestablish peace and in seeking a solution to the Kashmir dispute. (Telegram 595 from USUN, September 1; ibid.) Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement shortly thereafter fully endorsing the Secretary-General’s appeal. (Telegram 601 from USUN, September 1; ibid.) In Washington, Rusk called in the Indian and Pakistani Ambassadors and stated that the U.S. Government strongly supported U Thant’s appeal. (Telegram 261 to Karachi, September 1; ibid.)↩
- Apparent reference to a draft of the telegram sent on September 2 as telegram 266 to Karachi and 327 to New Delhi. The draft has not been found. For text of the telegram as sent, see Document 179.↩
- Paragraph 5 was apparently deleted before the telegram was sent.↩