176. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1
We just got some very disturbing reports that Paks have decided to escalate in Kashmir by throwing in regulars, because they can’t otherwise cope with Indian retaliation across the cease-fire line.
[Page 343]The rationale is that the Paks, having failed to spark a “war of liberation” via a Kashmiri uprising, may now feel they’ve got to enter the lists directly to forestall a humiliating failure. CIA believes that the Pak generals are very unhappy with their bum intelligence and with the failure of the Ayub/Bhutto gambit to stir up Kashmir.
But Pak escalation would trigger a critical Pak/Indian crisis—though still one big step short of a Pak/Indian war. There’s a case for sitting back a while longer and letting both Paks and Indians face up to the awesome risks involved. These might make both more malleable vis-à-vis us. On the other hand, the chances of an explosion are great enough so that we ought to push the UN hardest to intervene—and perhaps the UK too. We could supplement by private blasts at both Paks and Indians. My impression is that we’re not moving fast enough on this one (Goldberg was to see U Thant today, but we didn’t yet have the new alarming reports).
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret.↩