175. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1
Pak/Indian Roundup. Kashmir is still bubbling merrily and could blow up. U Thant fears the whole 1949 cease-fire agreement may collapse. He wanted to report blaming the Paks for starting the mess, but the Paks threatened to withdraw from the UN if he did. Nor are the Indians too eager to take Kashmir to the UN lest the whole question of its status be reopened (which is what the Paks want).
Bowles sees mounting pressures for Indian retaliation and urges we call the Pak bluff that they aren’t involved, lest they be encouraged to think they are getting away with the game. In fact, we have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a most reliable report that both the Kashmir infiltration and the earlier Rann of Kutch affair are part of a “well-organized plan” to force a Kashmir settlement. This plan was checked out with both the Chicoms and Indos. Worth reading (Tab A).2
[Page 342]The UK gambit. Wilson sent a rather bland letter to Ayub (Tab B),3 as an opener to get Ayub to see his envoy next week. We think we frightened the Brits enough to get them to try hard, but I suspect that after they sound out Ayub Harold Wilson will be back at you.
Meanwhile the true extent of our disillusionment with the Paks is being gotten out through various quiet channels (the Pak Ambassador here is highly chastened, whatever his demeanor on the Sequoia). Even if Ayub doesn’t come till October or so, all this will help insure that he comes in the right mood.
Ayub and Shastri Visits. The Kashmir flare-up makes it difficult for either to firm up plans now, though I’ll wager we could land Shastri if you wrote him directly, reminding him we’d love to have him though we realized Kashmir might get in the way. My hunch still is that this would also help move along Ayub.
Wednesday Meeting. Though we’ve scheduled a Wednesday4 morning meeting of Rusk, Mann, and Bell with you on Title III feeding programs, Bundy and I suggest we broaden it to include Pak/Indian problems in general. We keep putting out the word “no meeting no pledge”; but getting it directly from you would be quite useful at this point.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13, August 1965. Secret.↩
- Reference is to Intelligence Information Cable [number not declassified], August 26, 1965.↩
- An undated copy of Wilson’s letter to Ayub, offering British help with the Pakistan consortium problem, is attached at Tab B.↩
- September 1.↩