Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

166. Minutes of Meeting of the 303 Committee¹

Washington, August 9, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 9 August 1965

PRESENT

• Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, and Admiral Raborn
• Also present were Lt. General Marshall S. Carter (NSA), Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll (DIA), Mr. Robert W. Komer, and Dr. Huntington Sheldon

1. Pakistan

a. Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Komer to provide the committee with a brief summary of the Pakistan problem. Mr. Komer pointed out that we were seeking ways to persuade Ayub—the only person one can do business with in Pakistan—to come to us before the 23rd of September, the consortium deadline. Among the few visible means of leverage would be suspension of construction on the U.S. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] installations in Peshawar. Mr. Komer pointed out that the Paks regarded Peshawar as their hole card; if we could shake their confidence that this was so by such a gesture (while not affecting intelligence collection per se), it could indicate to Ayub that the U.S. meant business.

b. Ambassador Thompson stated that he had discussed these matters with Secretary Rusk, who wanted to talk further with Secretary McNamara. He also suggested that the suspension of construction ploy could have the opposite effect of that intended: instead of “shaking up” the Pakistanis, they might interpret that we were being deferential towards them.

c. The earlier suggestion of Mr. Vance that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was also thought to contain backfire possibilities: it might be difficult to get them back in at a later date, and it might be read as an admission that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] did not constitute a priority project.

d. Admiral Raborn felt that stopping the construction was a minimal gesture at best that would only muddy waters and could set in motion more undesirable events.

e. On the question of alternate sites, Mr. Komer pointed out that presumably the Pakistanis could publicize any moves we make in the direction of Iran [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with unfortunate results. Mr. Komer emphasized that ways to test the reliability of our ally were few and far between. He suggested [1 line of source text not declassified].

f. Admiral Raborn stated that he looked with little optimism on the alternate site [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as long-range risks and that Pakistan was, in effect, a bonded ally and all methods of negotiating should be explored. He felt the threat of suspension of foreign aid was the single strongest weapon in our arsenal and reiterated that the suspension of construction threat was a minor tactic.

g. Mr. Komer warned that higher authority was unlikely to respond to blackmail tactics by Pakistan. With the Pakistanis lambasting us on a regular basis it was going to be difficult when we reached the deadline of the 23rd of September to feed the hand that bites us. If we were then unable to make a pledge because it would seem like caving to Pak public pressures, the risks of Pak retaliation against Peshawar would go up.

h. Mr. Bundy summarized the disparate views and stated that we must all search for quiet ways to convince Ayub in the next six weeks. We sought to produce a tactical situation to reopen talks with Ayub and to indicate our state of mind. He concluded that agreement could not be reached in this meeting, and the matter would be referred back to the Secretaries of State and Defense. He emphasized that we want to avoid creating an atmosphere of haggle.

i. Generals Carroll and Carter summarized the exact status of the building program.

j. Mr. Komer indicated the spiraling nature of the situation down to 23 September and repeated that even small efforts could be worth trying now.

k. The Committee did agree to the following:

(1) to proceed rapidly with all preliminary planning for alternate sites;

(2) not to break ground for the construction of the BOQ at Peshawar (new construction, as opposed to work in progress);

(3) not to use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for approaches to Ayub in view of certain recent changes, [1 line of source text not declassified];

(4) the results of this discussion would be brought to the attention of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara as possible assistance in their deliberations.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Pakistan.]

Peter Jessup

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 C.24, August 26, 1965. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared on August 10 by Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff. Copies were sent to Ambassador Thompson, Vance, and Admiral Raborn.