165. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1
Pakistan Roundup. Our Embassy says the Paks are at it again criticising the consortium postponement (Karachi 193 attached).2 Bhutto just gave another speech criticising our aid to India over Pak protests. He blamed the US for the aid “stoppage,” but said it wasn’t aid anyway because it was loans which had to be repaid with heavy interest.
Since in fact we haven’t stopped aid, only postponed new FY’66 commitments, would you see merit in discreetly letting out this fact (we have almost $300 million in old aid in the pipeline, are still shipping last year’s wheat, etc.)?
Canada’s High Commissioner, who saw Ayub recently, is slightly more optimistic than our Embassy (Karachi 183 attached).3 He sees Ayub as at least admitting Pakistan might have been “guilty of some excesses.”
Pak pressure on Kashmir. We have good evidence that the Paks are stepping up infiltration into Kashmir, which could build up to a good-sized flap. The Indians are again threatening “strong countermeasures.” This could be the Rann of Kutch all over again, with each side alleging the other is misusing our MAP arms.
Iran’s Ambassador to Pakistan, a shrewd observer, says that Bhutto admitted his policy is based on the assumption that the US will be forced out of Vietnam and that Pakistan had better accommodate to an increasingly powerful Red China.
Suspending Peshawar Construction. Bundy and I have pushed this, but our intelligence people claim it wouldn’t be understood. It’s up to Rusk and McNamara.
Ayub Visit. Shoaib told the Australian Hicom that it was up to the big power, not the little one, to take the initiative for improving relations. We’ve sent your “message” via John Bonny, Goldberg has talked [Page 330] with the Pak at the UN,4 and we are waiting for Rusk to activate the promising UK circuit. You may want to raise this at Tuesday lunch.
In sum, it’s too early yet to tell whether we’re moving the Paks. If we don’t get some indications in the next week or so, however, we may want to step up our effort another notch.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13, August 1965. Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the President under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that the roundup on Pakistan might be out of date in that Komer was unaware of Johnson’s conversation with Rusk about sending Harriman to Pakistan. (Ibid., 7/1/65–9/22/65)↩
- Dated August 8; not printed.↩
- Dated August 6; not printed.↩
- UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg met in New York on August 7 with Amjad Ali, Pakistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Goldberg told Ali that he came at President Johnson’s request following a conversation at Johnson’s ranch. The President wanted President Ayub to know that he meant exactly what he said on U.S. aid to Pakistan, which was that a decision on such aid would have to wait until after there had been progress in Congress on the overall aid bill. Distortion of the reasoning underlying this decision in the Pakistani press had made things extremely difficult, and Johnson wanted Ayub to know that continuation of such distortions was not conducive to the good relations between Pakistan and the United States that had prevailed for so long. (Memorandum of conversation, August 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–7/65)↩