Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, July 16, 1965, 8:39 p.m.

78. Deptel 72.² Following summary based on uncleared memcon; FYI, Noforn and subject to revision on review:

Secretary met with Pakistan Ambassador July 16 to continue conversation reported reftel. Secretary told Ambassador he had seen press reports Ayub PML speech July 14 sharply critical US; thought it desirable resume discussion after full text available. Secretary wondered, however, on basis apparent GOP public reaction to date what GOP had in mind and where we went from here.

Ambassador said reaction in Pakistan had been foreshadowed in oral message he had communicated earlier. He understood GOP stance to be it sought no confrontation with USG but still believed postponement Consortium session provocative and discriminatory. General policy GOP remained one of supporting principles moderation, peaceful settlement disputes and good neighborliness (even with India if it would agree). GOP felt in pursuit this course it had made contributions to moderation and responsibility Afro-Asian world. Even where there had been differences with Allies, especially on continuing arms aid to India, Pakistan had not gone off deep end. He thought it fair to say that in matters vital to US Pakistan as ally and friend had been very mindful US requirements. Ambassador cited as examples Ayub’s speech Peiping advocating a negotiated settlement South Viet-Nam that recognized US interests and Ayub’s firm refusal go along with Chicom and Soviet demands to include condemnatory paragraphs against US policy Viet-Nam in joint communiqués after visits those countries.

After both visits US Ambassador Karachi had been given detailed briefing GOP actions. Nevertheless, Ambassador Ahmed doubted whether USG fully appreciated how Pakistan, even though “in lion’s den itself,” had sought to protect US interests. There may have been isolated instances, particularly where Pak politicians had said one thing or another, where US could take exception to Pak actions. But even so there was sharp contrast between Pak actions and those of India. India constantly made statements critical US policies South Viet-Nam but India seemed to be able to get away with almost anything.

Ambassador said essential point was whether or not Pakistan had joined with forces inimical to US. He was authorized to say in categorical terms that answer was no and he could say this with full authority his Government. Secretary interjected this was very important statement. Secretary found statement particularly interesting in light of fact he had recently felt it necessary to say in response query from Congressional friend that he really could not say what Pakistan would do should there be general conflict in Pacific. Ambassador said: “Well you have my answer.”

Ambassador observed U.S. of course could not expect Pak support on every issue. Secretary emphasized last thing in world we wanted was satellite relationship; wondered, however, if Pakistan wanted U.S. to be satellite of Pakistan. Ambassador said this out of question. Secretary said he not so sure; noted we had concluded at time Chicom attack on India 1962 that it in our vital national interest come to India’s support. From that point on U.S.-Pak relations ran into difficulty. Since then U.S. did not really know what Pakistan asking of us in our relationship.

In response, Ambassador discoursed on GOP disagreement U.S. policy toward India; emphasized view arms aid India could only be directed at Pakistan. In response Secretary’s earlier query about where we went from here, Ambassador said that if U.S. wanted discussions GOP ready have them whenever U.S. desired.

Secretary asked if it would be unfair to say that one source long-standing misunderstanding between U.S. and Pakistan had been different view from very outset as to objective our alliance relationship. We saw it directed against communist aggression; Pakistan apparently saw alliances as source strength against India. Ambassador said he could not really say; he assumed objective in any event was strong Pakistan that would not fall prey to anyone.

Secretary reaffirmed our interest in continuing discussion; said objective should be to identify both our common interests and points of divergence and see how we can circumscribe those differences. It possible that most of our problems had arisen out of misunderstanding and he thought there was good chance they could be cleared up.

During conversation Secretary said he wanted take opportunity inquire of Ambassador about report we had heard from Indonesian source that Indonesia getting C–130 spares from Paks. Indonesians had gotten C–130’s from us in past but we had suspended program after Indonesia began using them against Malaysia and one or two shot down. He assumed only C–130 equipment Paks had was from U.S. MAP. Ambassador said he uninformed but would check, adding comment Pak C–130’s “falling apart too.”

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Laingen, cleared by Laise, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Rawalpindi and repeated to New Delhi and London.
2. Document 151.