Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, July 15, 1965, 5:14 p.m.

72. Following summary FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review.

Secretary met briefly with Pak Ambassador Ahmed this afternoon² but did not get substance of our differences with Pakistan because meeting cut short by Secretary’s departure for airport to meet Amb. Stevenson’s funeral cortege. Talk to be resumed July 16 at 4 p.m. Talbot also present as well as note takers both sides.

Ambassador referred to report he had received of Ambassador McConaughy’s conversation with Shoaib July 11 from which he had concluded it view USG that political issues should not be linked with Consortium developments. Amb Ahmed said if this true this was sound position because it had after all been consistent USG policy not to link economic aid with political considerations. If however, USG should conclude on objective grounds that it must cut back commitment to Third Plan it only fair GOP should know soon so it could begin adjusting its own thinking. For present GOP must continue assume on basis preliminary Consortium meeting June that all members believed Pak Third Plan soundly based.

Secretary’s response emphasized three points. First, he did not want Ambassador to conclude from Consortium developments that we now tying aid to all sorts of political considerations. What we were doing was part of our way of dealing with facts of life on Hill. Secretary not sure that GOP fully appreciated depth of re-examination future aid legislation now under way, especially in Senate. House also had reservations, though of different kind. Conference committee on authorization bill deadlocked. In such situation it obviously important have better idea how things will work out before US makes major additional commitments in aid field.³

Second point Secretary emphasized was that if we are perhaps a bit difficult to live with these days, our friends abroad should recognize why. Fact was that we faced in Southeast Asia life-or-death issues involving danger of general war in Pacific. Situation highly dangerous because other side has shown no sign of wanting peace—which could come within 48 hours if they were ready. Our friends should recognize that when we faced with issues of this dimension we naturally deeply sensitive.

Third, Secretary said he wanted emphasize again cumulative adverse effect on Congress over recent years of differences between India and Pakistan and implication this could have for US policy. If India and Pakistan were at peace, subcontinent would be impregnable, arms race could be avoided and resources applied rationally across subcontinent. Indo-Pak tensions clearly had resulted in net added burden on all concerned including USG.⁴

Ambassador said he wanted to respond to Pak actions cited by Secretary previous conversation, namely Pak-ChiCom communiqué and Bhutto talk with North Vietnam FonMin Algiers. Ambassador said latter was in pursuance understanding Ayub had with PM Wilson that he would do what he could behind the scenes to improve outlook for Commonwealth Vietnam peace mission. Ayub had instructed Bhutto get in touch with North Vietnam FonMin at Algiers and Bhutto had done so but had run into stone wall. As for Peiping communiqué, reference to “imperialism” therein clearly not directed at US; to Pakistanis “imperialists” are Indians in Kashmir. Secretary said we accepted this explanation but when Communist regimes use this word in joint communiqués, it amounts to word of propaganda inevitably meaning US.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Laingen and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Rawalpindi and repeated to London in New Delhi.
2. The Embassy in Pakistan reported on July 15 that Ahmed’s scheduled July 15 meeting with Rusk was viewed as being of such significance that a Cabinet meeting was being deferred until a report of the meeting could be received. (Telegram 6 from Rawalpindi; ibid.)
3. AID Administrator Bell made similar points on July 14 in a discussion with Ahmed of economic issues bearing on U.S. relations with Pakistan. (Telegram Aidto 97 to Karachi, July 15; ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Pakistan)
4. Telegram 79 to Karachi, July 17, expanded the reporting on Rusk’s July 15 conversation with Ahmed. Touching on the problem of differences between India and Pakistan, Rusk suggested that the improved atmosphere following the settlement of the dispute over the Rann of Kutch might provide a basis for secret talks on the Kashmir issue. Ahmed agreed to relay the suggestion to his government. (Ibid., Central Files 1964–66, AID 9 PAK)