Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

149. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 13, 1965, 5:26 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Talk with Ambassador B. K. Nehru, July 13, 1965

PRESENT

• The President
• H.E. B. K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador
• Under Secretary Thomas Mann
• Mr. R. W. Komer

The President greeted Ambassador Nehru cordially. After some small talk, the President asked about Shastri’s trip to Canada and Europe. Nehru thought it had been quite successful. He described how Shastri had asked him in Ottawa how Vietnam was ever going to be settled. He had replied there was no easy way to settle Vietnam, but constant Indian comments didn’t help the situation any. In effect Shastri should keep quiet about Vietnam.

Nehru then presented a letter from Prime Minister Shastri,² which he described as a response to President Johnson’s letter of 5 June.³ The President read it carefully, remarking that he was very pleased that the Rann of Kutch issue had been settled. Nehru agreed that it was a “great relief.”

The President expressed his appreciation for Mr. Shastri’s letter. As for Shastri’s request that he see Finance Minister Khrishnamachari during the latter’s visit in September, he would be delighted to do so.

Then the President noted Shastri’s emphasis on food. He was considering a message to Congress on the Asian food problem so that Congress itself could become more fully involved. There was some feeling in the Congress against so much aid to other countries. Aside from the many complaints about aid in general, some Congressmen didn’t understand why countries like India should go for steel mills instead of fertilizer. The President’s idea was to get the House and Senate to debate out the issue of whether we should provide “food for famine”, and decide on what position they wanted to take. The President himself was strongly for providing such help. He kept rereading Barbara Ward’s book “Rich Nations and Poor Nations”, and felt deeply the moral obligation of rich nations like the United States to help others. So he had told Secretary Rusk just today that he wanted a food for famine proposal put before the Congress as soon as possible.

The President mentioned that because of the Congressional problem he had also held up a new pledge to the Pakistan consortium until the appropriation had been acted upon. He commented on the difficulties of getting the aid bill through, pointing out that the Administration had lost 12–8 on the bill in the Foreign Relations Committee, which simply shouldn’t have happened. But the Indians kept telling us how to solve Vietnam and Ayub was off receiving Chou En-lai. This sort of thing certainly affected the vote. We had had to get the proxy of Senator Symington who was ill in Bethesda, but finally got the vote reversed 10–8.

The President then described his current difficulties with conference on the authorization bill. Fulbright wanted a two year bill; the House was adamant on one year. Their positions were irreconcilable. Besides all this, the Senate had gotten tired and one afternoon had let $200 million get cut off the barebones request he had sent up. In an exchange with Nehru, the President indicated that he’d like to get the $200 million from the Senate side and the two year bill from the House side; but the House wouldn’t budge.

Then came the appropriation process. The President asked Nehru whether he had ever met Otto Passman. He described his next “easy job” was that of taking on Passman, who was always a tough customer. If he could only get by Passman, he was willing to gamble on the Senate in order to move ahead with discussions on aid to Pakistan.

On India’s food needs, the President felt that we should promptly send a food-for-famine message to the Hill. He described the difficulties on the agricultural bill this year—on which he thought we would probably get licked. When Nehru praised his record to date, the President philosophized about his increasing difficulties with the Congress. In his judgment a Presidential mandate lasted only about six months under the US system. The Administration was having increasing difficulty with the mass media, with the muttering of the “diplomats”, and with the Congress. So he was due for some reversals. It would become more difficult for the Administration to lead here and to lead abroad. He had no illusions about being able to maintain the present pace; in fact, he expected some reversals within the next 45 days. So he asked Nehru to give us any help he could in convincing the Congress about India’s food needs. The President insisted that Congress must share this responsibility.

Nehru, referring to the Shastri letter, indicated that India’s needs fell into two categories; first was the immediate need for food to avert great difficulty because India’s food stocks were exhausted; second was a longer range aid need for the next 5 year plan. Commenting on India’s immediate needs, the President said he certainly didn’t want people to starve but wanted the Congress to be in partnership on whatever we did. So he told Messrs. Mann and Komer to get busy on a message to the Congress. Meanwhile, he said, we could do what needed to be done if necessary to avert catastrophe.

The President then described “in confidence” the difficulties the US was having in Vietnam, and what we were going to have to do. We were going to have to put in more people—at least 100,000 and perhaps double that number. We would also have to go for several billion dollars more in additional defense expenditures this year, and probably call up reserves, postpone the discharges of people serving in Vietnam, even increase the draft—perhaps calling up married men. McNamara was going to Vietnam to get the facts on which to base any such decisions. As an added problem, the Republicans were beginning to criticize our Vietnam policy. People like Congressman Ford wanted the President to do reckless things, but he would not do so. We were not bombing Hanoi nor were we crossing the Chinese frontier. So the President was mystified by the Chinese accusation that we had done so; he speculated that perhaps the Chinese were seeking to provide an excuse to cover some move that they planned. As Nehru knew, we had also tried in every way possible to get the North Vietnamese to talk but had failed. Now the latest effort, Wilson’s sending Davies to Hanoi, had flopped too. The President ended up by indicating that he wasn’t pessimistic. He didn’t think we would lose out in Vietnam but it would be a long hard struggle. However, in view of the way the Indians seemed compelled to comment so often on Vietnam, we would certainly like to know India’s solution. If Shastri knew how to settle Vietnam, we wished he would tell us.

As an example of how things could turn out better than they seemed at the low point, the President cited the Dominican Republic situation. He thought that it was steadily improving. There would have been a Castro regime in another 24 hours if we hadn’t moved in. The Dominican Republic might yet go in this direction in the next election, but at least this would be a free choice.

At this point the President was informed that Ambassador Lodge was waiting, so he invited Nehru to stay and visit for a few moments with Lodge. After a brief discussion of the problems Lodge would confront in Vietnam, the President showed the group the Rose Garden.

R. W. Komer ⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Memos and Miscellaneous, 6/65–9/65. Secret. Drafted by Komer on July 16. The time of the meeting, which took place at the White House, is taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
2. Shastri’s July 9 letter to Johnson was devoted largely to prospects for India’s economic development. He expressed gratitude for U.S. economic assistance, which had contributed importantly to India’s development. Shastri noted that India was in the process of drafting its Fourth Five-Year Plan, which was scheduled to commence on April 1, 1966, and he asked if Johnson would discuss the draft plan with Finance Minister T.T. Krishnamachari when he visited Washington in September. Of more pressing importance, Shastri noted that the P.L. 480 agreement, which governed the flow of needed food grains to India, had expired on June 30. He asked Johnson to intervene personally to expedite the negotiation of a new agreement so that the movement of grain would not be interrupted. Finally, Shastri expressed appreciation for the renewed invitation to visit the United States and indicated that, although he would not be able to come until the next calendar year, he looked forward to a visit at a mutually convenient date. (Ibid., National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 4/15/65–2/28/66)
3. Document 127.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.