Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

122. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 20, 1965.

Here is a new pitch from Dave Bell² on the importance of going ahead with the remaining already authorized loans to India and Pakistan plus the advance program loans to both.

AID and State see a strong foreign policy argument for going ahead in a normal businesslike way, especially so as to avoid suspicion that there was a major policy change implicit in the postponement of the Ayub and Shastri visits.

Beyond this, however, Bell is quite concerned over his domestic budgetary problem. All of the money involved, including the advances, is from already appropriated FY’65 aid funds. If we don’t go ahead and obligate some of this before 30 May, it will look as though AID is crowding an unusually large amount of obligations into the last month of the fiscal year.

Worse yet, if we don’t approve any of these loans before the end of the fiscal year, AID will have about $250 million left over on 30 June. Since we presented the FY’65 aid program to Congress last year as a minimum figure, we will have some explaining to do if this large an amount is left unspent. A carryover of this size might also affect Congressional willingness to approve the full amount you’ve requested for FY 1966.

Therefore, Bundy and I would join State and AID in urging that you approve going ahead with this program. If we desire to exert pressure on Pakistan and/or India by holding off on various aid loans we can easily do so with FY 1966 money, where we will not be under the same end of the fiscal year time pressure. Should you still have questions, Dave Bell is eager to talk with you on this matter.

R. W. Komer

Approve

See me³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Limited Official Use.
2. Reference is to a May 20 memorandum from David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, to President Johnson. In the memorandum, Bell outlined the pending loans to India and Pakistan that would fulfill consortia commitments made to each country. (Ibid., NSC History, Indian Famine, Aug 1966–Feb 1967, Vol. IV)
3. Johnson checked this option line. Komer sent another memorandum to the President on this issue on May 25 urging a positive decision. Johnson responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads as follows: “Bob—Don’t press me or pressure me—I’ll get to this when I can, I hope today.” (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10, Apr 15–May 31, 1965)