121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

1305. Pak Ambassador G. Ahmed called on Acting Assistant Secretary Handley at former’s initiative May 14. Ambassador said he had very urgent message from his Government following up conversation he had had with Secretary May 11.2

Ambassador prefaced his remarks by saying British were now at most critical stage of negotiations and that as he understood it there were two main points of difference. First related to definition of issue itself and on this GOP view was that it of utmost importance that issue be clearly described as dispute that it is. This particularly important because next and important step was arbitration. Second point of difference related to re-establishment status quo. Indians insisting on reversion in Kutch to status quo as of January 1, 1965 and Ambassador said it seemed GOP prepared accept this. In view of much more serious [Page 261] problem however of present concentration forces along other areas Pak-Indian border, his Government felt it of extreme importance that agreement also provide for withdrawal forces all along Indian border. In response question from Handley, Ambassador said Paks had made this proposal a condition to agreement to British proposals but he unaware of any Indian response.

Ambassador then said he under instructions inform U.S. that GOP regarded this condition of very great importance, particularly because of recent serious violations Pak air space. On May 12 unidentified Indian aircraft had overflown Suleimanki; on May 14 Indian Canberra had overflown Kharian, headquarters Pak armored strength. Ambassador said that ordinarily of course such planes would have been shot down but such action not taken because of Ayub’s firm instructions up to now avoid any retaliatory action that ran risk broader conflict. His Government had now informed him however that because of latest overflights, PAF now under instructions take whatever action necessary deter further such violations. Ambassador said this emphasized extreme urgency of some agreement that would result in disentanglement of armies now facing each other along borders.

Handley said Ambassador well aware that we supporting British efforts. As Secretary said May 11 greatest possible prudence on both sides now essential and he wanted to re-emphasize what Secretary had said. He was sure Ambassador aware of tremendous costs to both countries should conflict ensue. He hoped strongly that agreement could be reached on cease fire so that both sides rather than risking pounding each other in battle would pound negotiating table across from each other. Said that alleged Indian overflights and possible Pak response highlighted extreme delicacy of situation and essentiality prudence and restraint on both sides. Handley said he would of course ensure that Ambassador’s comments brought to attention all concerned.

Ambassador said Paks already exercising restraint but this had to be considered against facts involved. Facts were that Indians now more seriously violating Pak air space. In East Pakistan at Lathitilla Indians were engaged in heavy firing at Pak positions that could have serious consequences. In West Pakistan India had four Divisions, including armored Division, drawn up as close as 150 yards and at 25-mile depth. In East Pakistan Indians had available seven Divisions, three of which near Sikkim facing Chinese but other four already poised at various places along East Pakistan border. All of these facts in Pak view emphasized need for U.S. to use its influence help ensure that there be speedy disentanglement of forces along borders and urgent steps to stop any further violations Pak air space.

In subsequent telephone conversation Handley asked whether Pakistan had informed India of stronger position it now taking on [Page 262] alleged overflights. Ambassador said he did not know. Handley stressed urgent importance Pakistan doing so. We would of course inform our Embassy Delhi and GOI of what Ambassador had told us3 but this clearly no substitute Paks taking steps immediately ensure that Indians aware instructions Pak forces now operating under.

Comment: We see G. Ahmed’s approach combined with Ayub letter4 as Pak effort designed enlist our aid in applying pressure on Indians at crucial point in British cease-fire negotiations. Their intent seems to be to try to shift our attention from Kutch and use of MAP there to broader question of possible Indian action elsewhere and our assurances relating thereto. We do not intend see GOP turn tables to keep our feet to fire instead of other way on.

For London: Please pass this urgently to Pickard.

Ball
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Laingen; cleared in substance by Murray in OSD/ISA, and Officer in Charge of UK Affairs Thomas M. Judd; and approved by Handley. Also sent to New Delhi and London, and repeated to CINCMEAFSA.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 120.
  3. After his meeting with Ahmed, Handley called in Indian Minister Banerjee and conveyed to him the warning concerning Indian overflights of Pakistan territory that Ahmed had passed on to Handley. The Embassy in New Delhi was instructed to make a similar approach to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Telegram 2408 to New Delhi, May 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 31–1 INDIA–PAK)
  4. See Document 120.