Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

117. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Use of U.S. Arms in Rann of Kutch

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• His Excellency B. K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
• NEA—William J. Handley, Deputy Assistant Secretary
• NEA/SOA—David T. Schneider, India Desk

Ambassador Nehru came in at his request to discuss Indo-Pakistan relations. The Ambassador said he did not want to discuss so much the pros and cons of the Kutch issue as the question of the use of U.S. arms by Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. He said that there was “incontrovertible proof” that Pakistan had used U.S. tanks against India in the Rann. The Ambassador presented the Secretary with nine pictures of tanks, trucks and soldiers which he said had been taken at Biar Bet by a low flying aircraft. The Ambassador read from a Reuters report which said that President Ayub had indicated Pakistan was using U.S. arms and was entitled to the use of all arms in its possession. He said that the Pakistani units involved in Kutch were MAP-supplied units. Summarizing his position, the Ambassador said it was “incontrovertible” that Pakistan had taken action against India to alter the status quo in the Rann and had used U.S. arms in contravention of U.S. assurances to India given by President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and Ambassador Bunker.

The Secretary said we had expressed our position on use of U.S. equipment quite strongly to both India and Pakistan. Ambassador Nehru asked what the Secretary meant by both sides. India had not used U.S. equipment. The Secretary said Pakistan claims to have captured U.S.-made 106 mm recoilless rifles. Our inspectors who visited the Indian lines, however, have not seen such equipment. It was on the basis of the claims of both sides that we made statements to both India and Pakistan.

Continuing, the Secretary informed Ambassador Nehru that we did not have the full story yet from our military observers but Pakistan had not denied it had used U.S. equipment. We had made it clear to Pakistan that we were not willing that such equipment be used. We have expressed our views strongly—very strongly. When the Pakistanis raised the question of our assurances to them in connection with a possible Indian retaliatory attack, we replied that we considered such a question hypothetical. We believe our representations have had something to do with the Pakistani decision not to escalate hostilities further in the Rann. We hope the British peace efforts will succeed in taking this dispute out of the military area to the conference table.

Ambassador Nehru said that while India hopes the Kutch question will be resolved, a more important question of principle is involved. U.S. assurances to India had been the foundation of Indian defense policy. If these assurances were eroded, it would be a very serious matter. The Secretary asked what Ambassador Nehru would have us do. At first, the Ambassador said this was not for him to say except that, as far as India was concerned, the U.S. reaction had been inadequate. When further pressed by the Secretary, he said an adequate action would be to tell Pakistan that the U.S. would not provide any more arms. He said he was without instructions on this point, however. The Secretary suggested the alternative of stopping use of U.S. arms in the Kutch area. Ambassador Nehru commented, “If you can.”

The Secretary asked Ambassador Nehru what he could say about Indian troop movements. Indicating he did not know the details on this subject, the Ambassador said what movement had taken place was of troops without U.S. arms. He then returned to the theme that Indian defense policy was based upon the assumption that U.S. assurances were enforceable, mentioning that a substantial part of the GOI had been committed to this belief. He said he had argued with the Finance Minister years ago against increased defense expenditures on the grounds that U.S. assurances would be carried out.

The Ambassador said one aspect of the problem regarding U.S. assurances was public and political. Mentioning a Selig Harrison article in the Washington Post and a speech by A.B. Vajpayee in Parliament, he described the great criticism of the U.S. in India for permitting Pakistan to use U.S. arms in violation of U.S. assurances. He then charged that the U.S. was merely equating India with Pakistan saying, “Every time Pakistan hits us, you must hit both sides.” The Secretary referred to reports he had heard of the movement of Indian mountain divisions, which he thought were MAP supplied. Mr. Handley noted that the 50th para brigade which India had used in Kutch had been furnished limited MAP equipment, but that it was not known if it had taken any MAP items with them.

The Secretary said that the test of the adequacy of our actions with Pakistan was the result, i.e., the end of the fighting. Ambassador Nehru said, however, something also must be done in public to help take care of India’s Parliamentary problem. The Secretary responded that what we say publicly should be related to the British peace effort. Ambassador Nehru agreed we should do nothing to interfere with that.

Looking to the future, the Secretary said we would get complete information on use of U.S. equipment shortly. Our people have already visited Indian forces and report they had not found any U.S. equipment. We have not had any report from the Pak side, but we suppose our inspectors will find U.S. arms. Then we will go to the Pak Government and ask that our understandings be complied with. At what point this becomes public depends upon the British peace-making effort.

Mr. Handley said that we had spoken most strongly to Pakistan, as Ambassador Bowles has told the GOI. The Ambassador responded that Pakistan’s use of the equipment nonetheless went on. When Mr. Handley pointed out that the proof of the effectiveness of our action was the cessation of hostilities, Ambassador Nehru said that India had also stopped and Pakistanis were still in Indian territory. The Secretary countered by saying that MAP equipment was not being used today to fire on Indians. Terming this a good argument but unsatisfying, the Ambassador said the credibility of U.S. assurances is in question and must be re-established. The Secretary repeated that the effectiveness of U.S. assurances and the cessation of hostilities were very closely related. The test of our fulfilling our assurances is in what happens. Taking issue with the Secretary, the Ambassador said the test was not whether the fighting stopped, but was whether Pakistan was prevented from using U.S. equipment. Under present circumstances, Pakistan can use the equipment at some other place again. The Secretary responded that if the Ambassador was suggesting that we take punitive action far beyond what is needed, such as a break with Pakistan, he should know we will not do this. The Ambassador replied he was not asking this and agreed with the Secretary that what we do is our problem regarding which he could not advise us.

Mr. Handley asked that since the GOI knows we have taken a very strong position with Pakistan and this had had a favorable result, was there anything that could be done in Delhi to tone down the public reaction? The Ambassador dismissed this question by saying that he did not believe his Government considered the U.S. has taken adequate measures. The Prime Minister had said as much. When the Secretary asked what the result of the British effort would be, the Ambassador replied that it would succeed but only because India would make compromises.

Returning to the subject of U.S. assurances, the Secretary said our objective was to end the fighting; then the question of use of U.S. equipment would not arise. If the problem of use of U.S. equipment came up again, we would deal with it at that time. The Ambassador replied this was not enough. It would not give India any assurance regarding the future. The Secretary said he should think that the cessation of the fighting was a demonstration that we considered our commitments to both India and Pakistan seriously.

The Ambassador reacted strongly to this comment asking why the U.S. insists on considering India and Pakistan together. India observes its commitments scrupulously; to equate it with Pakistan was wrong. One party has obeyed the law, the other has not. Why this equation? The Secretary again asked about Indian troop movements. He ended the conversation saying that we had made representations to both sides on the basis of charges made by both India and Pakistan. We would continue to try to get more information regarding use of U.S. arms. Ambassador Nehru concluded saying India had given full facilities to U.S. observers who had found no U.S. equipment. Therefore, the U.S. should not equate India and Pakistan when “the other side” is guilty.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Schneider and approved in S on May 17.