Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, May 4, 1965, 1700Z.

2125. Rann of Kutch.

1. I had a concentrated 15-minute conversation with President Ayub in Karachi today at a tea following investiture ceremony. He showed conciliatory attitude toward resolution Rann of Kutch dispute, but extremely tough posture toward Indians in event they attack Pakistan in new area. He said public opinion in this country would never condone a passive reaction to an unprovoked Indian strike at some new point along Pakistan border. In that event Pakistan would hit back without pulling the punch and he felt no other government could blame her. He noted that Pakistani forces had held back in the Rann. Could easily have pushed south to the 24th parallel and beyond. This restraint had been in deference to the views of their friends and to the fact that the situation was a confused one. The same restraints would not apply in the event of outright and flagrant Indian aggression in a new place unrelated to the Rann of Kutch.

2. I told President that we were strongly hopeful that Indians would not strike elsewhere. We felt that some of the strong statements made by Prime Minister Shastri in the Lok Sabha were dictated by domestic political requirements and should not be taken literally at face value. We were counseling restraint just as earnestly on the Indian side as on the Pakistani side. We thought that threatening talk on either side made the already dangerous situation more inflammable, and we hoped such talk could be avoided.

3. President said he was sympathetic with settlement efforts which British are making and he was cooperating to the best of his ability. Pakistan had been glad to do its part in virtual cease-fire now in effect.² He was rather worried that there had been some light artillery firing on May 2, significance of which was obscure. He said he had already agreed in principle to arbitration or mediation of substance of the dispute by impartial authorities of third countries. He would be willing to grant them every facility and to pledge the GOP to abide by their findings and their award. He hoped it would be possible to proceed promptly to this conclusive stage. He reiterated that Pakistan would agree to make the arbitration binding.

4. I raised the problem of intermediate stages, presumably involving a formalized cease-fire, disengagement, restoration of some sort of status quo ante and possible negotiation or discussion of substance of dispute between representatives of interested parties. The President was distrustful of Indian good faith during intermediate stages and expressed the view that any restoration of status quo ante during interim period should be dispensed with. He also thought bilateral substantive negotiation between the two sides would probably be useless or worse, with Indians inclined to take advantage of any intermediate sites to consolidate their position in upper Rann and then refuse to budge or admit existence of dispute, regardless of recommendations of any outside impartial body, as in case of previous Indo-Pak disputes. The President said he thought withdrawal by both sides from disputed zone was only necessary preliminary to arbitration or mediation effort. If Indians distrusted Pakistan observance of withdrawal agreement because of relatively higher terrain on Pak side of disputed area, he would be glad to agree to impartial military observers coming into disputed area to insure that neither side violated withdrawal terms while arbitral group was deliberating. He reaffirmed that Pakistan would accept arbitral award even if it was entirely unfavorable to Pakistan.

5. I told President that I regretted GOP decision not to allow visit of our MAAG representatives to that part of Rann which Paks hold. I had thought it would be useful for officers to see exact situation and extent of use of MAP and other military material. Especially in view Indian permission for our officers in New Delhi to visit Indian side, I thought negative Pak decision was regrettable. I noted that Paks had assured us they had nothing to hide and I thought a policy of free MAAG access to the combat area would be more compatible with Pak position that there is nothing to hide. It would also be more consonant with general [garble—nature?] of full confidence between GOP forces and our MAAG, which was implicit in the mutual defense relationship.

6. President said it was idea true [sic] that Pak Army had nothing to hide. He had felt that there was no particular point in military visits since Paks freely state and acknowledge that they are using MAP equipment and MAAG knows exactly what each Pak unit has. Forces committed to the area are all MAP supported and he pointed out that of course troops in combat use whatever equipment they have, regardless of origin.

7. President then astounded me by saying that he had approved turn [down?] of US suggestion for military visit to Rann area because he understood that it was proposed to bring out officers from the United States for this purpose. He did not see the necessity of this when there were highly-qualified MAAG officers in Pakistan who knew the situation better than any outside officers could.

8. President, in turn, was astounded when I told him he evidently had been misinformed by his people; that we had never suggested or even thought of bringing out officers from the US to make the inspection. I told him that of course we had proposed to use only resident MAAG officers. President replied that he had no objection to visit by MAAG officers and that he would give appropriate orders to facilitate immediate visit, if I wanted this done.

9. I told him I thought it would be a good idea, assuming he perceived no substantial objection. President said he had absolutely no objection although he doubted if anything new would be established as a result of the visit.

10. He then called Brigadier Riaz Hussain, Chief of ISID (who was standing nearby) over to join us and instructed him, in my presence, to arrange visit of two MAAG officers immediately. He turned to me to say that General Ruhlen, MAAG Chief, knew the score completely and he would like for him to go personally. I said we had thought in terms of the Colonel who was chief of the Army section under General Ruhlen and perhaps an artillery officer. But I had no objection to General Ruhlen going and I would ask him to go if the President wanted him included. The President told Riaz Hussain to arrange for General Ruhlen and one other MAAG officer, named by me or General Ruhlen, to go immediately. He said they should go first to Badin, then to Eighth Division headquarters and then as far down in the combat area under Pak control as they cared to go.

11. I am now consulting with General Ruhlen as to details with a view to laying the trip on for Thursday, May 6.

McConaughy

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Cables, 12/64–7/65. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London, New Delhi, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and DOD. Passed to the White House and CIA.
2. In telegram 2097 from Karachi, May 2, McConaughy reported on a conversation the previous night with Bhutto in which Bhutto said that his government had decided to observe a cease-fire, if India did the same. Bhutto stated that the paramount consideration in the government’s decision had been the special relationship with the United States. (Ibid.)