Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

79. Current Intelligence Memorandum¹

OCI No. 1109/65

Washington, April 23, 1965.

THE SITUATION IN IRAN

1. Iran, as it has for the last decade, continues to present a picture of relative peace and stability. Ruled by a pro-Western monarch who permits no organized open opposition, the country is making slight but visible progress in all fields without the revolutionary convulsions which have struck much of the Middle East.

2. The basic weakness of the situation has been heavily underscored in the last month, however, by the attempt on the Shah’s life by a conscript member of the Imperial Guard. Both supporters and opponents of the Shah expressed great concern at the incident—supporters because to insiders the Shah is indispensable, opponents because the Shah has not permitted the development of persons or institutions capable of continuing an orderly government if he were suddenly removed. The Shah’s reaction to the incident has been mild, considering that it came less than six months after the assassination of Prime Minister Mansur. There has been no widespread and indiscriminate crackdown on all opposition elements as would have been the case a few years ago. The Shah appears firm in his belief that he has widespread popular support for his “White Revolution” and that any opposition may be irritating but not dangerous. Coupled with this is his frequently expressed belief that he is under divine protection until he accomplishes his mission.

3. The opposition to the Shah is so disorganized and fragmented as to be powerless. A substantial portion of the Moslem clergy disapproves of his reform program because it involves redistribution of lands they have depended on, and suffrage for women. The clergy are reluctant to force a showdown, however, because the Shah has demonstrated that he is willing to destroy this group as a political force if he is pushed too far. The nationalist opposition—the National Front followers of former Prime Minister Mossadeq—are likewise in disarray. Watched and harried by the security services, there is little they can do that is not known to the government. The leadership has split between the older and more cautious who have advocated waiting until the right time to make a bid for power, and the younger radicals who insist that such an opportunity will never come and the only solution is violence. Nationalist students in the United States contend that an underground movement divorced from the old leadership and devoted to violence is getting under way.

4. There are few major problems between the U.S. and Iran. The American image has held up better in Iran than in most countries in the Middle East. Within recent months, however, this image has been tarnished by a clumsy presentation of the Status of Forces bill to the Iranian parliament, which raised memories of the hated “capitulations” formerly imposed by European powers. In an unfortunate bit of timing, a $200-million U.S. military credit bill was presented to parliament a few days later, giving rise to charges that Washington had bribed the Iranian Government to grant widespread immunities to US personnel. Although the Shah has increased his room for maneuver by a series of friendly gestures toward the Soviet Union, he remains firmly committed to the West. His main external concern is expanded pro-Nasir activities in the Persian Gulf area. This has given rise to greater Iranian activity in the Middle East in the form of providing aid to Kurdish rebels in Iraq, aid to Yemeni royalists, and cooperation with Israel on security matters and in connection with land reform.

5. The Shah’s “White Revolution”—distribution of landlord-owned villages to the peasants, the Literacy Corps to educate the villagers, and a medical and development corps to work in the villages—has started a trend that probably can never be reversed. Whether a bureaucracy that is noted for its inefficiency and corruption can maintain sufficient momentum to keep up with the rising expectations of the population is questionable. At this juncture the death of the Shah would probably produce a period of chaos from which a military dictatorship would be likely to arise.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 79–T00472A, OCI Intelligence Memoranda, 1–30 Apr 1965. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence.