300. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke)1
DJSM 790–68
Washington, June 25, 1968.
SUBJECT
- The Shah’s Visit—Follow-up Actions (U)
- 1.
- (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 19 June 1968, subject as above.2
- 2.
- (S) During the recent talks with the President, the Shah of Iran raised the question of the best military way of dominating the entrance to the Persian Gulf. The Shah also expressed his concern about the Russian Fleet and the Persian Gulf and asked whether the United States could fix missiles owned and controlled by Iran on the islands in the Strait of Hormuz to dominate it.
- 3.
- (S) By his concern, the Shah identified the major threat to the Persian Gulf as the Soviet Navy. However, this threat is not considered immediate and therefore all elements of the problem should be thoroughly examined before changing the proposed sales program, which was recently developed in response to previous requests by the Shah.
- 4.
- (S) Considering the range, nature of the target, usual temperature and environmental factors, it would seem that the Nike Hercules is the only missile in the United States inventory that would approach the Shah’s requirements. One or two batteries (nine launchers each) located on the mainland or on Larak or Qeshm Islands, could deliver 500 pounds of high explosive to any point in the strait with an estimated 200 yard circular error probable (CEP). A guided missile system would have the advantage that such a system could probably be established without the undue irritation that would be caused by measures such as mining. Disadvantages of the system would be the high cost (probably at least $4 million per battery), the need for another variety of specialized personnel, and the susceptibility to enemy destruction. Production lines of this missile are presently shut down. In addition, experience in use of the Nike Hercules in the surface-to-surface role is considered inadequate to justify expenditure of funds to employ this missile as possibly envisioned by the Shah.
- 5.
- (S) Presently Iran has a well motivated, competent Air Force which could operate with good effect in the Strait of Hormuz. This capability [Page 534] will be greatly improved with the programmed acquisition of F–4 aircraft.
- 6.
- (S) The Shah has also sought to procure PGM-84 missile boats with a surface-to-surface capability. These are also considered more practical, when available, than an island based missile system.
- 7.
- (S) Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz will not in itself keep the peace in the Gulf or maintain its Western orientation. Also, if the USSR should decide to move into the Persian Gulf, Iranian missiles would not be a deterrent. It is therefore recommended that an attempt be made to dissuade the Shah from procuring an island based surface-to-surface missile system.
B.E. Spivy"
Lt. General, USA
Director, Joint Staff