Office of the Historian

299. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, June 14, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • The Shah’s Visit—Follow-up Actions

As a result of his talk with the Shah on June 12,2 the President requested that memoranda be written on the following subjects presenting the basic proposition on each, the pros and cons and recommendations. The President would like to be as forthcoming as possible.

1.
Can the U.S. buy more oil from Iran on the basis of its being 100% tied to U.S. procurement? One aspect of this is whether the Defense Department might buy more oil for Vietnam from Iran. The main problem is to assure that any sales would be incremental.
2.
Can the U.S. provide USAF technicians in support of the F–4 aircraft that Iran is buying? The President wishes to give this sympathetic high priority consideration. What are the possibilities for meeting the Shah’s concern?
3.
Can we meet the Shah’s concerns about his radar and military telecommunications systems, with particular reference to the slippage in time? Since this was not spelled out in detail, it may be best to do a memo on each as a separate problem, noting the Shah’s concern and what the possibilities are of meeting it.
4.
How can we give the Shah assurance that he can plan on obtaining arms from the U.S. for his five-year program, i.e. that his planning can be long range, not on a year to year basis? The President made it plain in general terms that, within the limits of our world-wide arms sales program, he felt that Iran should enjoy high priority and be able to buy high quality modern equipment from us.
5.
What role can the Northup 530 aircraft play in the development of Iran’s air force? What are the facts on the development and financing of this project and could Iran participate in any consortium type arrangement for its further development?
6.
What is the best military way of dominating the entrance to the Persian Gulf? The Shah expressed his concern about the Russian Fleet and the Persian Gulf and asked whether we could fix surface-to-surface missiles owned and controlled by Iran on the islands in the Straits of Hormuz to dominate it.
7.
The President asked the Shah to consider shifting some of Iran’s dollar holdings from short term to a longer term basis to aid our balance of payments. The Shah, without committing himself, agreed that Governor Samii of Iran Central Bank should follow this up with the Treasury Department.

I believe it is permissible, if the Shah’s proposals as described are not clear enough to make possible an adequate response, to seek clarification of his concerns through Ambassador Ansary or Ambassador Meyer.

WW Rostow
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Memos & Miscellaneous, Vol. II, 1/66–1/69. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Bureau of the Budget Director, and the AID Administrator.↩
  2. Attached to a copy of this memorandum in Department of State files is a typewritten note that reads: “Meeting between the President and the Shah, June 12, 1968: President Johnson had a private meeting with the Shah of Iran and no formal memorandum of conversation was prepared. However, the attached memorandum for the record from Walt W. Rostow concerning follow-up actions for the Department of State was prepared as a result of the meeting.” (Department of State, S/S Conference Files: Lot 70 D 418, Visit of the Shah of Iran, June 11–12, 1968, Vol. I of II)↩