Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

160. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, July 23, 1966, 1430Z.

365. Ref: State 12039.²

1. Delivered President’s letter to Shah at Caspian morning 23rd. After careful perusal, Shah expressed appreciation for warm tone but observed that contents were identical with what I have been telling him.

2. Almost resignedly, Shah said everything depends on Russians. It was Iran which took initiative and it simply not possible for Iran call off approach made.

3. Shah said he first to recognize Russians “are my enemies.” At same time, in his opinion USG cannot “reproach” him for what he did. He reiterated usual line about waiting many months for American responsiveness but, while he appreciated $200,000,000 credit, USG prices were high, terms were harder than they should be, and delivery dates were far off. Particularly indicative of USG lack of sympathy, he said, was limiting sale of F–4 aircraft to 12 (which would mean 3 per airfield). This reflected persistent Washington disposition to make decisions which Shah feels are within his competence.

4. Once again I pointed out USG had indeed been responsive. In addition to credit, we agreeing to make available best military equipment in world, e.g. F–4 aircraft, despite fact that we fighting major conflict in Viet-Nam which requires full complement such equipment. Moreover, as President’s letter indicates, we continuing to review possibilities, e.g. F–4 situation. I made clear President’s personal interest in Iran and current problem in particular.

5. Reiterating he on spot with Russians, Shah insisted that he would reject any Soviet proposals if there any conditions attached. This led to assessment, which Aram had conveyed (Embtel 319),³ that Soviets have so much to gain from mere disruption of US-Iran military relationship that other considerations, including conditions, are of secondary importance. Shah agreed with that assessment, but opined that USG seems ready to leave, “luggage packed and with first class tickets.”

6. While recognizing that Shah may have gotten himself “in a box” with Russians, I expressed confidence he could extricate himself if he truly wished. Expressing assumption he “free man,” I said I did not see why just because he had approached Russians he required effect purchases, particularly since it possible to demonstrate that most of Russian equipment could be refused on quality grounds, e.g., SAMs. Shah assured me he “under no obligation” but it also clear he is so psychologically. I questioned economics of buying “cheap” SAMs with 5 percent efficiency when Hawks, though more expensive, have many times effectiveness.

7. Shah had received from General Khatemi info we had passed along re Hawks vs SAMs (State 8922).⁴ To this I added additional info, e.g. SAMs been diagnosed by our specialists, their vulnerabilities determined, and counter-measures developed which in not too distant future will be available through normal arms channels; that 82 SAMs been fired in Viet-Nam in last 90 days without a hit; that Soviets withhold some of the SAM data so as to maintain key control; and that SAM ineffectiveness in Viet-Nam is despite fact they manned by Russians. Shah said Pak mission which recently in Moscow was told by Soviets SAM problem was due to incompetent Vietnamese manning them. (Comment: Any sure info Washington has on this point would be helpful to us.)

8. Of parenthetical interest, Shah said Pak mission to Moscow at first ran into Soviet jibes re their American friends, their relations to CENTO and SEATO, etc. Subsequently, however, Paks were shown SAMs, a high quality tank with two anti-aircraft guns, truly remarkable mobile radar, etc. Asked if transaction concluded, Shah said no it is under Pak study. He implied Paks are worried about effect on their improving relations with USG. Shah said ChiCom equipment been provided to Paks completely “free of charge” (he agreed it is obviously for ulterior motive). Shah took occasion to emphasize importance Iran’s keeping door open to Paks to avoid further entanglement with Commie countries.

9. Asked what specifically Iranians have asked of Russians, Shah said anti-aircraft guns, SAMs and “other things” not coverable via USG or British credit. Reluctantly he indicated tanks cannot be excluded. He said plans must be made for replacing M–47’s. He had hoped for Sheridans. Reiterating no response yet received from Soviets, Shah said only clue was Soviet Military Attache recently asked an Iranian officer why Iran not interested in Soviet aircraft. Shah again assured that under no circumstances will he purchase MIG’s.

10. Shah insisted he will tolerate no Soviet “conditions,” e.g., ouster of ARMISH/MAAG, withdrawal from CENTO, or even stationing of Soviet technicians in Iran. Under interrogation, however, he appeared less sure that he could hold the line at just “some training of few students.” To illustrate his firmness re “conditions” Shah said Soviet Ambassador when Shah was in Europe called on For Ministry UnderSec Qarib, and referring to NYTimes article, protested USG strategic installations in northern Iran. Shah said he sent word back to tell Soviet Ambassador to “mind his own business.” Shah noted that in 1962 Iran had promised Soviets not to have foreign missile bases and Soviet Ambassador was told that no interference in Iran’s internal affairs would be brooked from any quarter. (Comment: This is first time Shah has referred to subject of our installations in any conversation on arms sales.)

11. Shah was greatly impressed by two phrases in President’s letter, i.e. U.S. “will not be so shortsighted as to turn from our close relationship”. And President’s fear that our “military assistance program” will be impaired. Shah bemoaned why would USG undertake “strong reaction” which would so clearly serve Soviet aim. Noting that it was not USG which has produced present situation, I said President in his letter gave three clear reasons why USG reaction inevitable. Even if Executive Branch were not involved, American people and Congress are. Moreover, potential compromise of highly classified equipment should certainly be understood by him. Observing that Soviets not bothered by such things as “this Congress business,” Shah again said USG can always find “excuses.” I said sharply this not question of “excuses.” Then went into lengthy explanation of how USG does not want its Hawks, Blue Shark and F–4’s compromised after example of Soviet SAMs. Pursuant to last para Embtel 311,⁵ I noted how difficult it would be to shield Soviet technicians from Blue Shark control, etc. Shah said he suspects Soviets already know much re U.S. equipment, and in my case he would shield US equipment, as for example by keeping Soviet technicians within walled compound way out in country.

12. Shaken but seemingly undaunted by Presidential declaration that U.S. military program here will be adversely affected, Shah reiterated his earnest desire that U.S.-Iran military relationship not be disrupted. He added, however, that if that came to pass, Iran would be able fill void from other sources. I reiterated that as long as Iran arms procurement is from non-Communist sources, USG does not object. Except for Soviet procurement, I agreed with Shah that there may even be advantage in diversification as a principle in order for Iran to have a more independent image.

13. Shah contended that while he turned to Soviets only because of USG’s insufficient responsiveness, there may even be one or two good points favoring the move. For one thing, it would demonstrate to the people of Iran that Soviets are arms peddlers (a criticism heretofore reserved only for Americans) as well as peaceful steel mill providers. Secondly, Shah said that by his dealing with Soviets it may help “break Soviet offensive in building up a bloc of so-called progressive states” in Mideast.

14. This provided occasion expound my theory that Soviet motives are diabolical. Soviets have no qualms about fueling regional conflicts, I said, probably realizing that as with Pak-India conflict last fall those conflicts will run out of gas in couple of weeks and both sides welcome UN truce order. Meanwhile, Soviets pour arms into countries friendly to them to assure their friendship. Shah himself interjected that in process they wean America’s friends and make them ripe for Soviet blandishments. Shah added that behind these moves Soviets are desperately trying shore up waning fortunes of Socialist-Communist system which is failing wherever it exists and which is doomed unless Soviets can divert attention from its failures. He cited Syria as product of these Soviet endeavors. I said this was precisely my main point, i.e., by loading up Mideast countries with arms Soviets can keep them weak and dependent. I said Soviet propaganda re “progressive” Mideast states, i.e., Syria, UAR, and Egypt, is hollow as long as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and even “unviable” Jordan are doing so much better than “progressives.” Obviously, I said, Soviets want to reduce all Mideast states to be Syrias. Shah agreed, but, of course, insisted that Iran has no choice but to build up adequate defense, as even Peterson mission, he added, had determined is necessary. Saying he doubted USG capable of handling several Viet-Nam situations at once, Shah said he continues to believe it is in USG interest to have Iran adequately equipped to deter or cope with regional threat in Persian Gulf area.

15. During course of conversation I pointed to President’s warm hope that Shah and he could talk things out. Shah showed gratification at this point but at same time made clear that his decisions re military procurement cannot wait until early next year.

16. Comment: There was no indication whether or not Shah will reply to President’s letter. Letter, however, was very timely both to get on record from highest US authority likelihood of significant USG reaction to Iran’s purchasing from Soviets and at same time placing on record President’s own desire to maintain close U.S.-Iran ties. My point in delivering letter personally was to provide additional info re SAMs and press point that if Shah really wants to he can find technical or other reasons for retreating from Soviet embrace. My impression is, however, that complete retreat is almost impossible, unless Soviets play their hand badly or unless USG comes through with some new proposals markedly more favorable in terms.

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–IRAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow.
2. Telegram 12039 to Tehran, July 21, transmitted the President’s letter to the Shah. (Ibid.) The letter is printed as Document 158.
3. Dated July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 IRAN)
4. Dated July 15. (Ibid.)
5. Dated July 20. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 U.S.-IRAN)