158. Letter From President Johnson to the Shah of Iran1
Your Imperial Majesty:
I have followed closely Ambassador Meyer’s reports of his recent conversations with you. He has told me of your concern over Iran’s defense requirements, and I want to share with you my own views on the developing situation before us. Candor between friends is essential to mutual understanding and my views are offered in that vein.
The total relationship between the United States and Iran, and particularly our cooperation in military matters, has been cordial and it has met the interests of both our countries. The U.S. for its part sincerely hopes that circumstances will permit this to continue in full effectiveness.
For we share a common view of certain basic problems. Thus we both understand that, while the immediate threat of Soviet military aggression has receded, indirect pressures continue and the Soviet aim of communizing Iran remains the same. I know clandestine radio broadcasts remind you daily of this long-range threat. You have shown your understanding of Communist aims by sending an Iranian team to Vietnam, and I am strengthened by this demonstration of your faith in our purpose there.
We also share the realization that the Middle East is undergoing rapid change. The unfolding situation, particularly in the areas south of Iran, demands our close watchfulness, as it embodies both potential opportunity and potential danger. At a time when the United States is heavily engaged in the defense of freedom in Asia, we are no less interested in continued stability in the Persian Gulf area. We welcome your determination to help maintain that stability. As responsible leaders, we share the awareness that our task is to make inevitable change as orderly and constructive as possible.
It was thus against a background of continuing comradeship between our two nations in facing together a complex and dangerous international environment and of concern for Iran’s security that we have offered an additional $200 million credit for the purchase of military equipment. We have been seeking by all means to develop fair and reasonable terms. We are also urgently working further on the particular questions of price and delivery dates for two squadrons of F–4 aircraft.
[Page 288]Our resources are, of course, burdened by the defense of free world interests in Vietnam. And they are limited, for military assistance purposes, by the Congress. Nevertheless, it remains our intent to respond to your security needs; and I believe we have done so.
You should have no doubt of our desire to help Iran. But you should also understand that if Iran were to enter into an arms arrangement with the Soviet Union or with other Communist countries, this would confront us with serious problems in carrying forward our military assist-ance.
While you may see short-term advantages to such a step, I see major long-term disadvantage, both political and technical.
- First, I cannot believe that any of us will profit by the Soviets’ coming any closer to the Persian Gulf than they already are. I would not guess that they regard it as in their interest that the stability of this area be increased.
- Second, it would confuse our Congress and our people concerning Iran’s intentions. I cannot predict precisely what the reaction here would be; but it would certainly be unfavorable to the interests which we share in strengthening Iran’s defenses.
- Third, on the technical side, I am certain you can appreciate our intent to protect sensitive American equipment from compromise by Soviet military technicians.
Our purpose in aiding Iran has been to preserve and strengthen your country’s independence. We are proud to have contributed to the gathering political and economic strength of Iran under your wise and skillful leadership. If Iran should turn to the Communist nations for arms, we will not be so shortsighted as to turn from our close relationship. But I do fear the impairment of our military assistance program.
Therefore, I hope that you will look only to Free World sources of arms in meeting your security requirements.
You will, of course, weigh this matter in the light of Iran’s basic interests as you see them. I did, however, want you to receive my views personally and with the complete candor our partnership requires and deserves.
I look forward to going more deeply into this and other problems of common concern when it becomes possible for us to meet. I will also very much want to hear directly from you more about the heartening economic and social progress Iran has made under your skillful leadership. Unfortunately, with our coming elections, I doubt we can manage to get together in the next several months. Perhaps early in the new year we could find a mutually agreeable time for direct discussion. In the meantime, [Page 289] I wanted to share with you now—in the spirit of the partnership I feel—the problems which might arise.
Sincerely,
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran, Shah Correspondence, Vol. II. Secret.↩