Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, January 27, 1967, 1231Z.

5986. Subject: South Arabia.

1. Future South Arabian developments reviewed in detail at two-hour session FonOff Jan 26 attended by Brewer (Dept NEA/ARP), Palmer (Embassy) and reps FonOff MOD, and Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM). Discussions were frank and specific, providing greater clarity on how both governments see situation developing and what can be done about it. Detailed airgram under preparation, but following gives highlights:

2. British side led by Marnham (superintending Under-Secy) and his replacement, Brenchley, made following points:

A. Though HMG still interested in helping provide stable future after independence, primary British goal remains “withdrawal in good order.”

B. British believe security situation will continue get worse and increasingly dubious independent local government derived from present SAFG can maintain itself thereafter. While independent South Arabia authorities will be able exercise “greater persuasion” vis-a-vis suspected terrorists without inhibition Western methods, this may be offset by disappearance British technical proficiency in security field. Planned expansion Federal Regular Army (FRA) is based on blanketing into army portions police. Additional police recruitment will thus be necessary. UK plans provide police superintendent shortly (two candidates under consideration) but outlook in police field particularly discouraging.

3. Regarding expansion FRA, three-year British subsidiary expected cover: (a) build up from five battalions to nine, including armored cars but no tanks; (b) addition reasonable air components of eight subsonics for internal security uses; (c) three small naval vessels. MOD reps could not immediately provide details re breakdown subsidy but promised do so.

4. On civil side ODM reps stated two economists (Selwyn and Holland) now in final stages preparation report on future economic prospects for SAFG. ODM promised provide Embassy copy when available. British could not meet all prospective needs, but 40 percent of total UK civil aid (other than to Commonwealth and colonies) next fiscal year would be designated for South Arabia. Specific figures now before cabinet for approval. “Substantial” budgetary support envisioned at outset, but on “sharply declining scale.” Long term, interest-free loans will also be offered, as well as topping-up salaries expatriate officials now employed by SAFG (of whom now some 50 British). Immediate problem will be covering SAFG April-December operating deficit. British will provide continuing assistance, but will cease covering whatever deficit may arise at end current UK fiscal year (March). SAFG will shortly be informed this unhappy prospect.

5. Re possibilities creating diplomatic enclave out of portion British base, Steamer Point already being discussed as possibility, though uncertain whether Aden local authorities or SAFG will take this over.

6. British agree accession Hadhramaut would be most helpful in strengthening new state but increasingly doubtful this will occur. Likeliest prospect may be some sort weak confederation between Saft and newly federated Hadhramaut states under Sultan Ghalib at Mukalla.

7. Brewer stressed continued USG recognition primary British responsibilities this region. Outlined Dept intentions give what support we could to SAFG in terms early establishment effective diplomatic presence and develop modest cultural and information programs. ODM reps expressed disappointment no direct USAID activity in prospect. Brewer responded by outlining Congressional and other limitations in this field and offered no hope direct aid help might be forthcoming.

Comment

8. Large British participation from three ministries indicates importance British attach to future US-UK cooperation on South Arabia problem. They seemed reassured at indications Dept intention work with SAFG after independence, but would of course have welcomed more in economic field.

9. Since some points foregoing particularly sensitive, believe should not be discussed even with British reps.

Kaiser

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Aden.