83. Airgram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia1

CA-3933

SUBJECT

  • Bahraini Views on Gulf Security and Request for Help from U.S.
1.
Shaikh Khalifah ibn Salman al-Khalifah, Director of Finance for the Bahraini Government and brother of the Ruler, made a private visit to the United States in mid-November under the sponsorship of CALTEX Oil Company. On November 17, accompanied by Deputy Finance Director Mahmud Allawi, he called on NEA Assistant Secretary Hare and left the enclosed paper2 as a statement of Bahrain’s concerns and desires.
2.
The bulk of Shaikh Khalifah’s oral remarks was devoted to emphasizing and reiterating the following points:
a.
Bahrain and all the other Gulf states are most worried over anticipated developments in South Arabia following the 1968 British departure. They fear the U.A.R. will take over in that region and ultimately threaten seizure of the Gulf. The U.A.R.’s current activities in Yemen foreshadow the nature of its possible future activities elsewhere in the Peninsula.
b.
Bahrain is most desirous that the British remain as protectors in the Gulf and has received strong assurances from HMG that they intend to do so. However, Bahrain feels that the same type of internal British financial and political pressures which led HMG to evacuate Aden may similarly lead it suddenly to leave the Gulf. In this contingency Bahrain most strongly hopes that the U.S. will be willing to assume some responsibility for Gulf security.
c.
Bahrain has close ties with Saudi Arabia, but the Saudis are, understandably, deeply involved in building up their own defensive capability and thus could not be fully counted on to assist others.
d.
Bahrain hopes that the U.S. will be in close touch with the British concerning developments in the Gulf and that we will begin to [Page 190] show a greater interest in the welfare and stability of the Gulf region. (Some possibilities for this are outlined in the paper left by the Shaikh.)
3.
In responding to Shaikh Khalifah, Assistant Secretary Hare summarized the U.S. attitude toward various Peninsula states as follows:
a.
Saudi Arabia. We have had a long relationship with the Saudis which, despite some ups and downs, has been fruitful and cordial. As a logical outgrowth of our general policy of opposition to the use of force or threat of force in the Near East, expressed in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and on various subsequent occasions, we have made clear our interest in preservation of the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia.
b.
Yemen. Our goals, enunciated repeatedly both in public and in private, are to see an end to foreign interference and development of a situation where all Yemenis are free to decide their own future. This is the extent of our desires in Yemen.
c.
South Arabia. Except for maintaining our Consular post in Aden, we have not in the past been directly involved with this area in view of the dominant British position there. Since the British have decided to relinquish this position, we have had frequent and close consultations with them regarding the area’s future. The British recognize the need to leave a capable security force there and to provide for economic assistance. They are taking steps in this direction. We follow their efforts with great interest and are concerned about the future of South Arabia.
d.
Gulf. We are now taking a new look at this region. We hope and expect that the British will remain there as long as needed. We have no direct military interest in the area although the presence of the headquarters of our Naval Middle East Force in Bahrain is a token of our general concern. We are most appreciative of Shaikh Khalifah’s comments, which fall on open ears at a time when we are giving extensive consideration to what our future activities in the Gulf area should be. The time available, while not limitless, is sufficient to allow us further to ponder this subject before reaching final decisions. In general, we hope all states with a common interest in the Gulf (including Iran) will work for its stability.
4.
Mr. Allawi commented that currently the American Protestant Mission in Bahrain, which has been in existence since the 1890’s, is in serious financial straits and might be forced to close either or both of the men’s or women’s hospitals it operates there. This would be taken by the populace as an unfortunate sign of waning U.S. interest. While understanding the problems which aid to a religious sponsored group might pose, he hoped the U.S.G. could be of some assistance. (The Department is not aware of any problem in the Mission’s operations, Dhahran’s report on this subject would be appreciated.)
5.
The enclosed paper from Shaikh Khalifah proposes some rather practical ways in which the U.S. might become more active in Bahrain. We have given a copy of it to the British Embassy in Washington and indicated that we wished to reply to Shaikh Khalifah. In view of British responsibility for the foreign affairs of Bahrain, we asked for HMG’s recommendation as to the most suitable channel for such a reply and said we would welcome British views on the paper itself.
6.
The addressees’ comments on the Khalifah paper would be appreciated.3
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL BAHRAINIS. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Eliot, Sommer, and Director of the AID Office of Near Eastern Affairs James C. Flint, Churchill (PC), UN Economic Affairs Division Chief Leighton van Nort, CU Near Eastern Programs Chief David Scott, and William C. Salmon (SCI); and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, Kuwait, and Tehran.
  2. Attached but not printed.
  3. Circular airgram CA-6646 to Dhahran, March 3, 1967, transmitted an informal response to Shaikh Khalifah’s paper. The Consulate was instructed to make clear continued U.S. support for the British position in the Gulf as providing the best framework for peaceful progress in the region and to stress the importance for security and stability of Bahrain’s cooperation with its Gulf neighbors. (Ibid.)