Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

77. National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, September 8, 1966.

NIE 30-1-66

THE OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH ARABIA

Conclusions

A. The British-sponsored Federation of South Arabia, comprising the prosperous port of Aden and the backward states of the Protectorate, is opposed by many Adeni politicians and by many sheikhs of the hinterland. Nonetheless, the UK has stated publicly that it will grant South Arabia its independence by the end of 1968, at the same time closing its base in Aden and ending its obligation to defend the area. London will almost certainly pull out by the appointed date, and may even do so earlier.

B. The British withdrawal will end the ten-year boom in Aden that has greatly increased the economic activity of that port and swollen its population by 50 percent. Closing the British base will cause a decrease of at least 25 percent in Aden’s income. Political unrest could further reduce the use of Aden’s port, leading to the loss of another quarter of Aden’s income. There is likely to be little change in economic conditions in the hinterland of South Arabia.

C. Local political forces are now jockeying for power and seeking the backing of other Arab states. Saudi Arabia is giving some help to conservative elements, especially in the eastern part of the Protectorate. More importantly, the UAR and Yemeni republicans are supporting dissident elements, especially in Aden, and are sponsoring subversive and terrorist campaigns there which make continued turbulence likely. In the circumstances we believe it unlikely that the Federation will long survive the British withdrawal.

D. Even in the period before independence, the chances of an accommodation between the Protectorate rulers and Aden are not good. There is little likelihood that the British could bring to power an Aden government sufficiently conservative to be acceptable to the Protectorate rulers without its being unacceptable in Aden. If the British permit the tribal leaders to control Aden, nationalist violence would be likely; and if they permit the nationalists to regain a voice in the government, the sheikhs would be disturbed. The nationalists themselves might even refuse to participate. In any event, the issue could probably not be solved without violence. In either case, the Adenis would need, and probably get, outside support for their cause.

[Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate and an annex.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 30, Middle East. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Helms and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on September 8.