Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

76. Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Washington, August 9, 1966.

US MILITARY INTERESTS IN SOUTH ARABIA AND ADEN

US security interests in the area are:

a. Access to Aden facilities.

b. An adequate flow of Persian Gulf oil to Europe.

c. Denial of the area of the Soviets and the ChiComs.

d. Availability of British forces for operations with the area.

e. Prevention of a UAR-Saudi Arabia confrontation.

Periodic bunkering for COMIDEASTFOR ships (there are three), periodic fueling and logistic support of trans-Indian Ocean ships and aircraft and a few other flights constitute the US cold war needs. In limited war and area evacuation plans, Aden is an area of primary importance, although there are alternates which are somewhat less acceptable. The Gemini/Apollo plan for forcible recovery of astronauts and capsules designates Aden as a primary staging area for MEAFSA.

The loss of the availability of Aden for US military operations will:

a. Require revision of current plans.

b. Hamper but not prevent attainment of objectives envisioned in present plans by means of alternate and, in some cases, not quite as convenient routes and facilities.

c. Lend emphasis to expeditious construction of alternative US/UK military facilities in the Indian Ocean area. The appendix to this paper sets forth a discussion of the more important US military interests in Aden, oil for Europe, communist penetration, the availability of British forces and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning Aden and support of US military operations in the area.

It is concluded that Aden serves as a useful US military enroute and staging area but US military interests can be met by other alternatives.

[Apparent omission] British to remain as long as possible. From an operational point of view, the loss of the availability of Aden for US operations will:

a. Require revision to current plans.

b. Hamper but not prevent attainment of objectives envisioned in present plans by means of alternate and, in some cases, not quite as convenient routes and facilities.

c. Lend emphasis to expeditious construction of alternative US/UK military facilities in the Indian Ocean area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed the problem of US security interests in the midst of continuing instability in the Near East and Africa in connection with contingency planning in the area. They conclude that the instability will continue notwithstanding all the efforts to prevent it and that rights of any sort will probably be more difficult to obtain and, if obtained, of uncertain tenure over the coming years because of this instability. Instability would be present with or without Soviet influence, but is often aggravated by Soviet support. Thus, the US ability to project forces into the area should focus on more reliable alternatives than “rights” which one day may be granted and the next denied. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided guidance to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA in this regard concerning the development of contingency plans which involve operations through or in the area.

Over the years Aden has lost much of its strategic importance except in case of general war. Ships rely less upon enroute support facilities. Development of the French port of Djibouti, but a few hours from Aden, has further reduced Aden’s importance to shipping. The increasing number of ships which cannot be accommodated by the Suez Canal (the largest US carriers and the newer super tankers of 79 feet draft) reduces further Aden’s importance.

From the standpoint of air traffic, longer range, faster and larger aircraft have lessened Aden’s importance. US access to air facilities in Ethiopia, Dhahran, Bahrein, and Sharjah, Masirah as well as planned facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territory when developed will lessen still further the impact of the British withdrawal from Aden upon US military interests.

[Here follows the body of the paper.]

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POLMUSCAT & OMAN. Secret. Attached to a note from Sober to Ambassador Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies, and NEA/ARP that reads: “The attached assessment by the JCS of US Military Interests in South Arabia and Aden has been forwarded to me by Brig. Gen. Sibley, JCS member of the IRG/NEA, at my request in anticipation of IRG consideration of the South Arabian situation.”