Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

61. Intelligence Memorandum¹

OCI No. 1812/65

Washington, June 9, 1965.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ADEN²

Summary

For the past nine months, the British authorities in Aden have been confronted with a terrorist campaign mounted from Yemen but directed by Egyptian intelligence. The British believe that this campaign is coming to have serious political impact, but they are reluctant to enforce rigorous new security measures for fear of blighting the development of an independent, relatively friendly government in southern Arabia.

1. Last November, an “Arab nationalist” campaign of terrorism began to attack the British position in Aden. This campaign is the work of a relatively small group of trained men, who are directed by Egyptian intelligence experts and who use Yemen as a safe-haven. So far, the attacks have been aimed mainly at British forces and Aden government officials, especially the Special Branch of the Aden Police, which is concerned with subversive activities.

2. The scale of the terrorism is not yet large. During the first five months of this year there was a total of 75 incidents, in which 8 persons (3 British) were killed and 69 (40 British) wounded. Together with other developments in Aden, however, the terrorism has had a significant depressing effect on local morale. Moreover, the campaign has succeeded to the point that local Special Branch officers must be replaced by expatriates, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

3. The forces available to maintain internal security in Aden are considerable. There are 1,050 civil police, who may be assisted by 13,500 British troops in the Aden garrison. There are also nearly 5,000 British-led troops in the army of the South Arabian Federation, but most of these are already committed to security duties in the hinterland behind Aden which constitutes the Federation’s territories.

4. These forces cannot function effectively, however, unless the authorities receive either substantial cooperation from the local population or backing from London for the enforcement of considerably more rigorous security measures. At present, neither of these conditions is being fulfilled.

5. The majority of Aden’s 250,000 inhabitants are apathetic rather than positively anti-British; they tend to stand aside from a struggle which they feel is simply between the British and the Egyptian-backed terrorists. This attitude is very largely a reflection of the population mix—only a fifth to a quarter of the people are Aden Arabs, while some 80,000 (mostly laborers) are from Yemen, 40,000 are hillmen from the hinterland who themselves dislike the Adenis, and another 80,000 are orientals, mostly of Indian origin, who stand aloof from Arab politics.

6. The British are reluctant to introduce more rigorous security measures, which under the circumstances almost certainly would require using British troops, because they are in the process of trying to link the backward territories of the Federation with heterogeneous Aden to form what they hope will be a viable state functioning under their general guidance. This process began with the founding of the Federation in 1963 and looks toward completion—in the form of independence—possibly by 1968. Such an evolution would be difficult to guide under the best of circumstances. Faced with the pressures of Arab nationalism from at least a vocal minority inside Aden and from Cairo radio outside, the British are understandably chary of suspending the embryonic local government and using strong measures to suppress a terrorist campaign of which only they and the police have been the principal victims.

7. Thus the local government has been allowed to retain responsibility for antiterrorist action, although it has actually impeded security efforts. Curfews are applied only occasionally and in limited districts, to avoid offending any major part of the population, and the enforcement of special emergency decrees is lax. Moreover, travelers still pass freely to Egyptian-occupied Yemen. The situation is not helped by pay disputes between the government and the police and fire brigades, nor by a slowdown among the workers at the oil refinery, Aden’s only large industrial installation.

8. The effect of British restraint is to put at risk one of Britain’s most valuable military assets. Aden is a base for the protection of Persian Gulf oil; a garrison area for the defense of British interests in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Indian Ocean area generally; and a major British contribution to the world-wide Western defense system. As currently operated, it is the largest and busiest RAF station in the world and, after Singapore, the largest British base complex outside the UK itself. In terms of commercial strategy, Aden is the largest bunkering port in the world and the third largest port of any kind in the Commonwealth. It is not surprising, therefore, that the British high commissioner stresses the psychological importance of not giving the impression that this prize will shortly fall to Nasir.

9. [11 lines of source text not declassified] At some point in the not too distant future the British will have to decide whether the threat from terrorism is sufficiently dangerous that they must put the political development of Aden in jeopardy and use their own forces. (Map)³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
2. This memorandum has been coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and NE Division/DDP. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Not reproduced.