60. National Intelligence Estimate1

NIE 30-64

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in the Arabian Peninsula over the next few years, and to discuss the interaction of these developments and of such external forces as the UAR, the UK, the US, the oil interests, and the Communist countries.

Conclusions

A.
The modernizing, nationalist movement which has profoundly changed the rest of the Middle East in the past two decades has only recently started in the Arabian Peninsula. The great wealth which oil has brought in recent years, improved communications, and education are stimulating modernization and the intrusion of external forces. The conflict of these forces with traditional society and government and with one another will increasingly set the tone for the years ahead. (Paras. 1-4)
B.
The principal current problem is the confrontation between Nasser and the British, between Arab nationalism and Western strategic and commercial interests. The British feel that they need a special political and military position in the Peninsula in order to maintain their access to oil at an acceptable price. Nasser opposes the British presence and probably hopes eventually to replace British influence with his own. The most significant current manifestation of this controversy is the tension between the UK and the UAR over Aden and Yemen. (Paras. 10, 19-20, 39, 42)
C.
In Yemen, sentiment against the massive UAR presence is growing among republicans and royalists alike. The republicans are attempting to reach an accommodation with important northern tribes and certain royalist leaders, and thus effect a decrease in that presence. Nasser’s fear of losing a predominant influence will make resolution of Yemen’s internal problems long and difficult. (Paras. 7-9, 39, 43)
D.
British difficulties in building a stable Federation of South Arabia, by combining the relatively advanced Aden Colony with the backward [Page 142] sheikhdoms, are increased by UAR support for dissidents in both places. Nasser is likely to continue this support, and the British are likely to retaliate against rebels supported by him, possibly with attacks on Yemeni territory. Nasser almost certainly will not deliberately commit Egyptian troops to major action against the British, but hostility between Nasser and the UK is so strong that either side might take risks leading to an unintended military confrontation. (Paras. 23, 25, 43)
E.
Saudi Arabia’s recent modest social and economic progress will probably continue at least as long as Faysal rules. Faysal will find it difficult to win positive support from the small but growing educated class and from urban labor, especially if the country fails to make political progress. However, we do not believe that critical pressures against the monarchy are likely to develop in the short term. Kuwait is taking its place among the modernizing Arab states, and, although free of direct British control, remains on good political and commercial terms with the UK. In the other sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, Britain, recognizing that political changes are inevitable, will probably be able to cope with such pressures for change as arise over the next few years. (Paras. 12-15, 46, 47)
F.
The Soviets projected themselves into the Middle East with the 1955 arms deal with Egypt, but their only access to the Peninsula until recently has been Yemen. They would like to eliminate the Western position and influence, hence they are willing to assist Nasser’s efforts to achieve the same ends. In Yemen, the Soviet presence and influence are considerable and may increase; they are not likely to match those of the UAR or to overcome traditional Yemeni xenophobia. Elsewhere there probably will not be any great increase in Soviet fortunes. We believe that Communist China will not achieve a significant position in the area within the period of this estimate. (Paras. 49-55)

[Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate and an annex.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 30, Middle East. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 24.