Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

474. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, March 30, 1968, 1205Z.

5178. Summary. Following summarizes extended three hour session between YARG MinFin, ARP Country Director and EmbOff on civil war and future USG/YARG relations during which MinFin conveyed official message re restoration diplomatic ties and USG assistance vis-a-vis Saudis in resolving long-standing civil war.

1. YARG MinFinAhmed Abdu Said arrived Rome for meeting with EmbOff in accordance arrangements earlier worked out here at YARG initiative. Already in London on other business, ARP Country Director Brewer participated in session at Italian FonMin March 29. Min Commerce Attar accompanied Said to Ministry but Said met alone with Brewer and EmbOff.

2. Burden Said’s presentation, which he stressed specifically authorized by YARG Presidential Council, was two-fold: (a) USG should recognize YARG or at least take lesser step, such as assigning officer Italian Embassy Taiz, which would manifest USG interest in Yemen; and (b) USG should communicate to SAG YARG interest in mutual efforts to end civil war.

3. MinFin asserted top level YARG united in desiring progress on foregoing. Cos [sic] abd al-Wahhab, who MinFin claims supports cabinet, had heartily endorsed Said’s mission, saying he himself prepared even “Go to Israel” if necessary end civil war. As MinFin described it, present republican leaders worried about radical threat from unnamed junior officers with either Baathist, ANM, or Communist sympathies, as well as concerned with growing radicalism in Aden. Faced with these pressures as well as royalist activities, YARG leadership fears radical influence in Yemen likely increase at their expense unless some YARG/SAG detente achieved. MinFin said continuation low level of fighting of last four weeks would ease situation but renewed heavy fighting would undercut YARG moderates and render almost impossible later peaceful solution.

4. As to message which YARG hopes we will convey SAG, MinFin said his government is inflexible on only one point—exclusion of Hamid al-Dins from Yemen. Leadership prepared consider compromises other points. When Brewer asked if this included “state of Yemen” formula and inclusion non-royal family royalists in cabinet, MinFin said all possibilities could be considered in context Saudi/Yemeni efforts end conflict. Problem was YARG did not know what Saudis desired, but feared worst.

5. MinFin then reviewed what he described as past efforts current regime improve contacts with SAG. Sallal had been dropped. In November-December YARG had been in contact with Saudis and elderly respected figure Mohammad al-Hijri (imamate ex-minister now on republican side) had “ticket bought” go Asmara in December as al-Amri rep to meet Saudi emissary. For reasons unclear YARG, Saudis had called off at last minute. YARG also had sent delegation Beirut meet tri-partite committee, though some officers had objected. YARG disappointed SAG “allowed” Hamid al-Din Prince head royalist delegation. YARG had also sent Attar to Kuwait to see if GOK could again be active but has heard nothing.

6. In reply, Brewer assured MinFin our basic friendly intentions Yemen people. We aware current leadership had been in Cairo jail not in power Sanaa when YARG broke relations with US. However regrettable, this had produced factual situation we had to recognize. We nevertheless always willing meet informally with senior YARG reps, such as Said, to discuss outstanding problems. YARG efforts in connection evacuation aircraft had been appreciated in Washington. MinFin interposed that YARG also recognized compensation due for damages US official and personal property. Brewer welcomed this assurance but noted continuation civil war situation created serious problem for US in considering any formal steps improve ties. We had no wish become involved on either side in internal dispute but did desire do whatever we could advance a settlement.

7. Re YARG efforts mentioned para 5 above, Brewer asked whether present cabinet had sought through such means get word to SAG that Hamid al-Din issue is only item on which regime not prepared consider compromise. MinFin replied he thought not. Brewer noted our influence vis-a-vis SAG is limited and indicated message might have more impact coming directly from YARG. He was confident Arabs could find means contact other Arabs directly if they wished. Perhaps neutral Yemenis in Beirut could help. MinFin said Nu’man and Pasha reluctant but Kuwaiti was coming SAG April 6 on FAO business and cabinet might send message back through him.

8. Brewer stressed necessity YARG recognizing that Saudi control over Hamid al-Din limited and SAG did have legitimate security concerns re Yemen developments. In Saudi view, royalists still lawful government. If YARG seriously interested in compromise, it no good simply calling publicly for meeting with SAG, as Saudis would have to reject this. Republicans should be more flexible in seeking quietly get their views across. YARG might regard SAG as threat but opposite also true. Saudi villages had in past been bombed by planes based Yemen and Yemeni infiltrators had caused trouble. Though in no position speak for SAG with whom we had not recently discussed this question, Brewer speculated that chief Saudi concern was to see their country not menaced by foreign forces operating from Yemeni soil. Replacement Egyptian by Soviet help to YARG thus hardly an improvement.

9. MinFin sought play down Soviet involvement, asserting only Russians now Yemen were mechanics needed service aircraft. He agreed YARG should itself continue seek ways bridging gap with SAG but asked that YARG views be conveyed Saudis by his old friend Ambassador Eilts. Brewer replied conversation would be reported fully and we would of course do whatever we could help resolve current impasse. Extent to which Ambassador Eilts might be in position communicate these views, would, however, depend on circumstances. Saudis might well discount another message through Americans. If YARG sincere, it should not expect others solve its problems but find way acting on its own behalf.

10. Said repeatedly pressed for assurance USG would at least agree assign officer to Italian Embassy Taiz. We gave him no encouragement, noting effective means contact already exist and possibility American official presence could be used by Yemeni extremists to set back prospects favorable evolution our relations. Said saw point but indicated he anxious take something concrete back to cabinet.

11. Comment: MinFin gave every evidence candor and friendliness throughout conversation. While no doubt disappointed not be able achieve more tangible results from single talk, we believe he does recognize USG wishes YARG moderates [well] and will so report. His pleas for continuation low level hostilities obviously self-interested but we feel this attitude stems more from concern at future republican moderates than out of alarm at royalist military capabilities and should thus not be taken as sign military weakness. His primary concern seemed to be for future Yemeni moderates like himself unless somehow a compromise with Saudis can be worked out. We believe MinFin grasped our primary message that further YARG efforts on own behalf to achieve compromise on civil war are needed before great progress on USG/YARG bilateral relations likely. We hope he will use this message prod his colleagues accordingly but believe, assuming Dept concurs, that Ambassador Eilts might be authorized pass substance foregoing to Saudis at level and in manner he deems appropriate. Should of course be stressed to Saudis that information arose in course one of our periodic informal discussions with YARG officials at their initiative on which we anxious Saudis be promptly and fully informed.

Ackley

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, Aden, Kuwait, Tehran, London, and CINCSTRIKE.