Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, February 29, 1968, 1645Z.

122374. Jidda 2692.²

1. Dept has been giving considerable thought to implications for Yemen civil war represented by Faisal’s decision resume arms shipments to Royalists (reftel). As in past, our main concern re Yemen situation is whether opportunity may be provided by prolonged fighting for expansion and consolidation Soviet presence. While our own info admittedly incomplete, we continue to believe neither Republicans nor Royalists likely achieve decisive victory for some time. We accordingly continue hope renewed efforts can be made, perhaps through Arab Tripartite Committee with Saudi and UAR support, to move this problem to the political arena. While past conciliation efforts have aborted, we gather there still flicker of interest in such solution in certain Arab quarters. In our view, these flickers should be fanned, as this development would be likely reduce opportunities for expanded Soviet and radical Arab (e.g., Syrian) presence in Yemen.

2. FYI. While admittedly highly sensitive, we would appreciate any info you can develop re HMG policy toward Yemen civil war, now that UK out of PRSY and withdrawing from Gulf. We aware British in past extended some support to Royalists but unclear whether any tangible help continuing. We inclined to view that early resolution Yemen conflict should be overriding goal, but British in past have apparently thought differently. End FYI.

3. Embassy accordingly instructed approach FonOff informally and casually. You should note it has been some time since we compared notes on Yemen developments and express concern at implications protracted fighting might have for consolidation Soviet position. You may draw on substance para 1 above and inquire how British view situation now that they no longer present in Southern Arabia. We particularly interested in current British position on Yemen problem and how best they think Communist presence there can be reduced.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Battle in draft and by Irving G. Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda, Tehran, Aden, Kuwait, and Dhahran.
2. In telegram 2692 from Jidda, February 4, Eilts reported that the King had informed him that Communist interference in Yemen had nullified the Khartoum agreement and that he had therefore decided to resume arms aid to the royalists. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 6998 from London, March 6, Ambassador Bruce reported that he discussed the Yemen situation with Assistant Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Brenchley on March 5 and with Head of the Foreign Office Aden/Yemen Department McCarthy on March 6. Brenchley expressed the opinion that no military solution in Yemen was possible and argued that the civil war there was of no concern to British or U.S. interests; every foreign power that intervened in Yemen got bogged down in a morass of inter-tribal rivalries. McCarthy stated that even if they tried hard, which seemed unlikely in view of their December experience, the Soviets could not succeed where the Egyptians with 70,000 troops had failed. (Ibid.)