Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

429. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 28, 1967, 1206Z.

5738. Reference: Cairo 5030² and Jidda’s 3391³ and 3473.⁴

1. During President’s dinner for Ould Daddah last evening Foreign Office Under Secretary EL Feki asked me to call on him this morning which I have just done.

2. EL Feki said President Nasser had been pondering most seriously suggestion of possible US mediation UAR-Saudi difficulties mentioned by Ambassador Battle during his farewell call on March 4. President now wished US to know that he would in principle accept Ambassador Raymond Hare in this role. If he could be made available, final decision on mediation would, of course, have to be reached in light his terms reference and parallel Saudi agreement.

3. I said I personally was greatly heartened by President’s response to offer put forward by Ambassador Battle and knew that he would be also. I would report this development immediately and would recommend prompt and favorable USG consideration.

4. Comment: This is first break we have had in many months of deterioration US-UAR relations. I feel Ambassador Hare is logical and ideal choice and that assuming he is acceptable to Saudis will just by undertaking task greatly lower temperatures in area and give US-UAR relations much needed blood transfusion.

5. Would appreciate Department’s reaction soonest and if possible prior Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s departure from Cairo April first.

Nes

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda.
2. In telegram 5030 from Cairo, March 4, Battle reported that during his farewell call on Nasser, he had raised the subject of Yemen and asked whether on his return to Washington he should urge the U.S. Government to join in one of several offers to mediate or to take the initiative on its own in that direction. Nasser responded that he had gone to Jidda and entered into the Jidda Agreement against the advice of his colleagues. He was not now hopeful of a solution in view of the other side’s determination to view this as a sign of weakness, which it had not in fact reflected. Battle said that he took this to mean Nasser would not oppose U.S. efforts, but did not hold out much hope for their chance of success. Nasser agreed that this was his attitude. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Document 393.
3. Dated February 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)
4. Dated February 25. (Ibid.)