Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

400. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, May 2, 1966, 0808Z.

1040. King Faisal’s comments on Yemen.

1. By prearrangement, Ambassador Hare² and I called on King April 30 in Riyadh. Meeting lasted more than two hours, was extremely cordial and informal. King warmly welcomed “long time friend” and after a while decided session should be considered “family” rather than official gathering and did rare thing invite us smoke. Also present were Prince Sultan (who made special flight from Jidda to be there), Saqqaf and Rashed Pharaon. After extending invitation to King visit US (septel)³ Hare alluded to Sultan’s able presentation of King’s views to President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and others during MODA’s recent visit to US. King and Sultan obviously pleased.

2. Most of meeting devoted to discussion of Yemen. Hare recalled his own previous connection with Yemen while Amb to Saudi Arabia. At his request, King then outlined background and status current Kuwaiti mediation effort. Noted Kuwaiti FonMin’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and UAR during which both sides had outlined their points of view. Kuwaitis have said they plan bring Khouli to Riyadh to discuss outstanding issues with Saudis, but SAG has heard nothing further about any dates for such visit. Kuwaiti FonMin also indicated his readiness join any such session to help parties minimize areas of disagreement. King said he agreeable such meeting, but was noncommittal on prospects for success.

3. This led King into lengthy review of development of Yemeni problem with emphasis on Nasser’s failure comply with various agreements reached with him, despite lip service of willingness to do so. King specifically mentioned Bunker agreement, Alexandria conference and most recent Jidda agreement. Saudis, King insisted, have done all possible facilitate Nasser’s withdrawal from Yemen with honor and dignity. Haradh conference aborted because of UAR failure tell YAR leaders of obligations assumed by Nasser in Jidda agreement. In contrast, Saudis have kept Yemeni royalists under control. Indeed Yemeni royalists were displeased with some aspects Jidda agreement, but King had insisted they must accept it. Hare noted Secretary’s strong view that Yemenis must ultimately decide their own form of govt. King said this also his view and referred to two major outstanding issues of composition interim govt and Hamid ad-Dins. Implication his comments was that Saudi positions on these two items intended allow Yemenis themselves to choose.

4. King’s account was largely re-hash of what he and other senior Saudi officials have repeatedly related to us. Throughout session King kept reiterating unanswered question “Why” has Nasser apparently changed his position. He cited various reasons adduced by “some people” for this. One is that “outside” forces are pressing him to do so. (Pharaon here interjected account of Nasser’s trip to Moscow few days after Jidda agreement. Thereafter Nasser had seemingly taken new tack.) Another is that Nasser afraid of reaction of UAR military to any withdrawal. Third is possible desire move into Aden vacuum when Brits leave. There even “some people” who argue USG wants Nasser remain in Yemen in order lessen prospects of Arab-Israeli clash. King noted all of foregoing conjecture and confessed he unable fathom reasons for Nasser’s seeming change. He was deeply puzzled about it and its implications. He wondered if USG had any info which might throw light on Nasser’s current position on Nasser’s seeming turnabout on Yemen.

5. Hare disclaimed any special USG knowledge of what might be prompting Nasser’s action. He asked King if His Majesty knew of anything internal in UAR which might have some bearing on Nasser position. King said he did not. King noted immediate aspect of problem watched by SAG is border situation where Egyptian military has regrouped. Sultan interjected account of recent intrusion several UAR tanks into Saudi territory about which he claimed he had not heretofore told King. Fortunately there had been no firing and Egyptians had subsequently apologized for incident and claimed tanks got lost. (This presumable same incident reported Embtel 1024.)⁴ Sultan noted that if single Saudi or Egyptian soldier had panicked and started shooting situation could quickly have deteriorated.

6. Hare commended King’s statesmanship in exercising patience and restraint in present admittedly difficult situation. Hare noted that our relations with UAR can hardly be described as satisfactory, but as with other difficult states we continue to try to keep dialogue going. King agreed on need for patience, but wondered how long forebearance can be continued. Sultan noted UAR has regularly been bombing certain Yemeni royalist villages last few weeks.

7. Comment: While nothing startlingly new came out of lengthy Yemen discussion, opportunity for King get things off his chest with senior American official from Washington was useful. Have subsequently been told by Saqqaf that King very satisfied with meeting. One point of passing interest, apropos of nothing, was comment by King in discussing Kuwaiti mediation effort that Kuwaitis quoted Nasser as telling them USG had told Sadat that Sultan had complained to Secretary about Soviet installations which UAR allegedly permitting be built on UAR territory. King’s purpose relating this round robin exposition unclear, and he did not pursue point.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Repeated to Cairo for Ambassador Hare, London, and Taiz.
2. Assistant Secretary Hare was on a trip to the Near East during which he visited several other capitals, including Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.
3. Reference is to telegram 1038 from Jidda, May 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD)
4. Dated April 28. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD)