Office of the Historian

396. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1

Washington, March 26, 1966, 3:25 p.m.

5397. Ref.: Jidda’s 856 rpt info Cairo 218, London 236.2

1.
Clear from reftel Nasser speech March 223 serious setback to Nasser-Faysal dialogue and progress toward peaceful settlement in Yemen. Such public statements can only impede settlement and therefore clearly inconsistent with description Nasser’s attitude given earlier same day to Secretary by Amb. Kamel, who said Nasser sincerely wishes withdraw from Yemen. Therefore believe desirable you seek early meeting with Nasser to obtain clarification. On hopeful assumption Saudi-UAR differences still in fact relate to conditions of settlement and not intent, consider it important prevent possible misunderstanding and miscalculation on both sides from jeopardizing prospect solution Yemen problem. You should draw as appropriate on reftel and Deptel 53474 stressing:
(a)
Faysal considers March 22 speech personal attack on him that belies UAR assurances to us that Nasser anxious extricate himself from Yemen in peace and with honor.
(b)
Whatever motivation and intent of speech may have been, result is serious setback to progress toward peaceful settlement in Yemen. Present circumstances postpone possibility high level meeting we had hoped might break impasse and provide key to settlement.
(c)
We appreciate pressures on Nasser, difficulties he faces and frustrations he feels but importance to all of peace in Yemen warrants exercise maximum patience, wisdom, hard work, sacrifice, and above [Page 748] all quiet diplomacy. Peace with honor is two-way street, and alternatives clearly unacceptable.
(d)
In light Faysal’s reaction to March 22 speech and fact reply required to Faysal’s message from Khartoum, next move clearly Nasser’s. We believe situation offers opportunity for statesmanlike action.
(e)
We believe indication by UAR of willingness send high level emissary to pay respects to King and discuss with Saudi official of equal rank such outstanding problems as exist might do much to mitigate unfortunate impression made by speech. Such meeting could provide way convey response to Faysal’s latest proposals and conceivably pave way for eventual Nasser-Faysal meeting.
2.
In manner you deem most appropriate, you should re-emphasize continuing U.S. interest in peaceful Yemen settlement leaving no doubt important bearing this issue on US-UAR bilateral relations and UAR hopes for new PL-480 agreement.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda and London.↩
  2. In telegram 856 from Jidda, March 24, Eilts reported that he met with the King on March 23, and once again urged an early Faisal-Nasser meeting as the best way to break the present impasse over Yemen. The Ambassador said he was aware of Nasser’s March 22 speech attacking Saudi Arabia, but Nasser’s speeches should be taken for what they were—emotional outbursts—and this should not be allowed to obstruct the search for a Yemen settlement. Faisal said Saudi Arabia had been trying for a long time, and noted that Nasser had said in his speech that he was prepared to stay in Yemen for 10 years. He said that in view of Nasser’s speech, he was no longer willing to send a high-level person to Cairo, nor was he prepared to meet with Nasser. After much urging from Eilts, Faisal agreed that the U.S. Government might, if it wished, indicate to the United Arab Republic that he was willing to receive a high-ranking UAR official in Jidda and to designate a Saudi official of equal rank to discuss the Yemen problem with him. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In his speech on March 22 Nasser had threatened to attack “bases of aggression” in Saudi Arabia.↩
  4. Dated March 24. (Ibid.)↩