Office of the Historian

387. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1

Washington, February 20, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • Visit of Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz

I. Circumstances of the Visit:

King Faisal has asked you to receive his brother who is carrying an urgent special message. We are unaware of the subject but believe [Page 727] it will reflect Faisal’s deep concern over the Yemen problem. Prince Sultan is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] well regarded by the King.

II. Faisal’s Position on Yemen reflects the following:

1.
Concern that Egyptian troop withdrawals from Yemen have not yet started and belief that Nasser does not intend to honor commitments to complete these withdrawals by the end of September 1966; (We believe Nasser will withdraw but not until the Saudis agree to an acceptable transitional regime.)
2.
Belief that the Soviets are financing Nasser’s staying in Yemen in order to establish a foothold in the Red Sea area, including submarine bases; (We disagree, believe Saudi figures on numbers of Soviets and Chinese Communists in Yemen are highly inflated, and consider unfounded Saudi claims of Soviet naval or military installations in the Red Sea region; we are willing to share with the Saudis our detailed assessments of the Communist threat.)
3.
View that U.S. PL 480 food deliveries to the UAR abet Nasser’s remaining in Yemen; (We disagree: the threat of loss of our food aid is not sufficient to bring Nasser to accept humiliation in Yemen.)
4.
Expectation that he will resume aid to the royalists if Egyptian troop withdrawals do not soon begin. (We caution patience; resumption of aid would result in renewed fighting, the Jidda Agreement contains obligations for both sides.)

III.

Failure of Nasser and Faisal to agree on such vital arrangements as the form of the interim government in Yemen and the ratio in it between royalists and republicans make it unlikely a resumed Haradh conference could achieve results. Faisal seems increasingly inflexible and his failure to respond to UAR overtures is a major factor blocking agreement.

IV. Recommended points to make to the Prince:

1.
The objective of all parties should be an independent Yemen in which the Yemenis are free to determine their own future without any outside intervention.
2.
The Jidda Agreement of August, 1965 provides the best basis for achieving this objective. We believe it unlikely the current misunderstandings can be resolved without renewed contact between King Faisal and President Nasser of a serious, frank and flexible character. We urge that King Faisal seek this contact. We are similarly urging President Nasser to be flexible.
3.
Resumed fighting could well force the republicans into greater reliance on the Soviets and the UAR.
4.
We continue highly to value the friendship of Saudi Arabia and reaffirm our support for Saudi territorial integrity. As we have previously [Page 728] informed the Saudi Arabian Government, we could not permit this commitment to be used as a shield for Saudi initiatives in the Yemen situation that would provoke UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia.
5.
We most appreciate Faisal’s support for our position in Viet Nam and his efforts at last fall’s Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca to prevent condemnation of U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam.
6.
You are pleased at the cooperation between our two countries in the development field, including the recently concluded agreement for assistance from our Department of Interior for construction of a five million gallon per day water desalting plant at Jidda.

Dean Rusk 2
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Saudi Arabia, 1965-March 1966. No classification marking.↩
  2. Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.↩