Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, January 20, 1966, 4:18 p.m.

4031. Embtel 1712,² Jidda tels 584,³ 595.⁴ Yemen.

1. In view indications of worsening Cairo-Riyadh relations, believe it appropriate you again discuss Yemen problem with top-level UAR.

2. Suggest you draw on following points:

a. US continues strongly desire peaceful solution to Yemen problem and development all-Yemen administration. Hopeful prospects for this, contained Jidda Agreement, have played significant role in improvement US-UAR relations.

b. We disturbed at reports cooling of atmosphere between Cairo and Riyadh, particularly in view importance good SAG-UAR relations not only re Yemen but for broader stable climate for development and progress in Near East.

c. Appears to us that problem may arise from lack detailed exchange views at highest SAG-UAR level, complicated by speculation at lower less informed levels. In this regard we understand SAG concerned that UAR troop withdrawals from Yemen not started. We hope initial failure Haradh Conference has not cooled UAR support for arrangements contained Jidda Agreement. At same time we recognize UAR and SAG may have honestly differing interpretations of troop withdrawal provision of Agreement. Would suggest that if UAR has timetable for troop withdrawals, informing SAG of details would greatly contribute to dissipating latter’s concern.

d. We aware rumors and press speculation re pending development “Islamic Pact” of conservative forces arising from Faisal visit to Iran. We doubt likelihood creation such grouping and of course have played no role in matter.

e. Hope UAR will do utmost encourage Yemenis resume discussions as scheduled and assist where possible in enabling them reach successful conclusion.

f. Continued progress on Yemen helps us to defend aid to the UAR.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore and Russell, cleared by Symmes and Davies, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, Taiz, and London.
2. Telegram 1712 from Cairo, January 8, reported a meeting with senior adviser to Nasser, Hassan Sabri al-Khouli, to explore UAR attitudes toward Yemen. Al-Khouli described the basic problem as a four-sided interpretation of the Jidda Agreement and said that the solution lay in an agreed UAR-Saudi interpretation. He commented, however, that King Faisal was playing a “mysterious and evasive game” and said that all UAR efforts to arrange a high-level meeting or agreement on details of a settlement had been fruitless. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 584 from Jidda, January 16, Ambassador Eilts reported that following presentation of his credentials, he had a 40-minute conversation with King Faisal about Yemen. Faisal warned that unless UAR withdrawal took place to allow the Yemenis to work out their own destiny, there was a threat of communism taking over in Yemen. The King said that the United Arab Republic showed no signs of wishing to honor the Jidda Agreement and that no withdrawal was taking place. On the contrary, he had received reports of further UAR military deployment to Yemen. (Ibid., POL 17-1 US-SAUD)
4. In telegram 595 from Jidda, January 18, Eilts reported that, at the King’s suggestion, he met with Dr. Rashad Pharaon on January 17 to discuss the current situation in Yemen. Pharaon said that Nasser’s most recent letter to Faisal, carried by Saudi Ambassador Ali Reza from Cairo to Jidda, reiterated his intent to implement the Jidda Agreement terms in letter and spirit. However, Ali Reza had also conveyed Nasser’s oral message that he could not begin troop withdrawals until an interim government was formed. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
5. Telegram 1855 from Cairo, January 21, reported that Parker met on January 20 with Al-Khouli, who told him that if the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia cooperated, peace in Yemen was possible. He said that, in an effort to break the deadlock, Nasser had sent Faisal a personal letter proposing a new agreement including UAR withdrawal within the 10 months prescribed by the Jidda Agreement, i.e., by September 23; establishment of a transitional government to be composed of one-third royalists and two-thirds republicans to be called the “Transitional Government of the Yemen”; and banishment of the Hamid ad-Dins from Yemen until after the November 23 plebiscite. Al-Khouli argued that if Faisal really wanted a solution, he would have responded immediately to Nasser’s proposals. (Ibid.)