Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

361. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 24, 1965.

SUBJECT

• The Yemen Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Muhsin al-Aini, Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic
• NEA—Phillips Talbot
• NE—William D. Wolle

Ambassador Al-Aini called at his request to discuss developments in Yemen. In summary, the Ambassador’s remarks constituted a passionate indictment of the U.A.R.’s activities in Yemen and a request that the United States through diplomatic efforts encourage Saudi Arabia to support Zubairi’s Party of God movement as an alternative to its policy of full backing for the royalists.

The Ambassador said that Zubairi and his people were continuing their efforts to build support for the Party of God. They were apparently having some success in gaining tribal support from both Y.A.R. and royalist sides. He did not know if Zubairi had had any contact with the Saudi Government so far.

Mr. Talbot said it was the Department’s impression that more U.A.R. troops are now in Yemen than ever before, and that the rather favorable atmosphere of last fall, when it seemed President Nasser and King Faisal were working toward settlement of the Yemeni problem, has unfortunately vanished. He said it seemed that the Arabs somehow ought to be able and willing to face the situation and seek a solution. Ambassador Al-Aini said that his government had been promised that Jordan’s King Hussein would contact Nasser in an effort to help clarify the situation and advance toward a solution, but he did not know whether Hussein had taken any steps as yet. Mr. Talbot said he had no information on this but that during his recent discussions with King Hussein in Amman on other matters, he gained the impression that the King would be anxious to help, if possible, on the Yemen problem.

Ambassador Al-Aini said he was convinced that the Party of God movement gave the Saudi Government an alternative to continued support of the royalists. Why did the Saudis not take this opportunity and make contacts with the new movement? It was certainly more representative of the thinking and feelings of the Yemeni people than the Hamid al-Din family elements which were in the vanguard of the royalist camp. The Ambassador said he thought the U.A.R. would reconsider its policy in Yemen if it became clear that the Party of God movement had great support.

The U.S. Government, said the Ambassador, should not remain aloof from the problem but should help toward a solution. Mr. Talbot reminded him of the major American efforts of 1963-64 and of the Bunker missions. The Ambassador responded that Zubairi’s movement was a new factor and that U.S. diplomatic assistance at this time could be effective. He then launched a bitter attack against U.A.R. activities in Yemen, describing the Egyptians as the “worst colonialists any country has experienced”. He ascribed to the U.A.R. the objective of occupying and using Yemen for its own interests and said the U.A.R. would never willingly withdraw from his country. U.A.R. actions were savage and inhumane. Not content with bombing Yemeni villages by day, the U.A.R. was now conducting air raids at night against “thousands and thousands” of Yemenis. It had devastated huge sections of the Arhab district. Mr. Talbot asked if the Ambassador was aware of recent unconfirmed reports that the U.A.R. forces were using poison gas. The Ambassador responded that “everything is possible” and that the Egyptians would stop at nothing to carry out their designs. He claimed to have factual reports that U.A.R. forces had even burned persons alive in front of others. He declared that Nasser wished the Hamid al-Din family to remain at the helm of the royalist opposition so that he would have a popular pretext for his own designs in Yemen.

Mr. Talbot referred to the situation along Yemen’s southern border, stating that an opportunity to establish greater peace in that area may have been missed, inasmuch as the new Labor Government in the United Kingdom might have seen fit to change somewhat the direction of British policy had it been met halfway by the Y.A.R. The Ambassador responded that the Egyptians are fomenting the difficulty in the south. He said the U.A.R. had organized the National Liberation Front to spearhead terrorism and that the Cairo press and radio are attacking all the old political groupings in the south which historically had been working for advancement of the peoples’ interests. The U.A.R. is using violence indiscriminately in the south, he said, because it wants to replace the British as the occupying power.

The Ambassador concluded that Yemen must be aided for the sake of the entire Arabian Peninsula. It is, he said, the duty of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States to help out in this situation. It must be realized that the unified Yemeni people are facing “a tyrant” (the U.A.R.). Mr. Talbot assured the Ambassador that the Department watches the situation with sympathy and understanding. He said he wished to make it clear that he could not give any encouragement that the United States could entertain the idea of assisting the Party of God or any internal domestic group in Yemen. The U.S. continued to hope the situation would improve and that there would appear among the parties concerned the necessary concessions and willingness to change which might make a settlement possible.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on February 26.