Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

333. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, April 28, 1964.

Mac—

Butler’s case to Rusk is “Nasser is our implacable enemy.”² The UK recognizes this, and the US will too in time. The UK is the target now, but we’ll be next. So, since Nasser has declared war on them, the British are going to fight back: (a) They’ll match UAR/YAR subversion in South Arabia with a stepped up covert campaign in Yemen; (b) they want us to cut off aid to Nasser; (c) they plan to bring the case against the UAR to the SC, and want a promise of US support. (It was left vague whether UK wants us only to back demilitarization of a border zone, or to back a harsh condemnatory blast too.)

The Brits, in their frustration and concern over Aden, are grossly over-reacting. So far the UAR/YAR threat to Aden is more talk than anything else. With 40,000 troops in Yemen, Nasser still can’t control the place.

But the clinching argument against the UK proposals is that they can’t win:

1. Regardless of the covert or overt pressure, we can’t force Nasser out of Yemen. Since September 1962 he’s repeatedly demonstrated that he’ll send in whatever amount of force is necessary to hold on (it’s 40,000 now). And instead of bowing to covert external pressure he’ll up the ante with counter subversion (as he did with Saudis till we turned them off, and as he is now in countering continued UK covert support of Royalists).

2. We and UK couldn’t win in the UN either. It would become a straight “colonial issue” on which we usually lose. The way to defend Aden is to keep it out of the UN.

3. True, we could bleed Nasser indefinitely in the Yemen (as UK has been doing in fact for months). But this is one of factors which make our disengagement policy fail. We keep Nasser in the Yemen by bleeding him.

Worse yet, we’d stand to lose far more than we could conceivably gain.

1. We wouldn’t just be waging war with Nasser. Except for the Saudis every Arab state would back the UAR. In fact, we’d solidify the Arabs against us, largely because Nasser would again agitate US/UK support of Israel—the one surefire Arab cause.

2. When Nasser ups the ante the logical focus of his attack will be the bases in Aden and Libya. So instead of preserving our base rights we’d increase the ultimate pressure on them.

3. Butler says they’d stay covert, but this is impossible in the Middle East (we know). The whole affair will soon leak as Cairo trades legitimate charges of subversion with London.

4. The threat to Aden is far from immediate (it will take the UAR years to make Yemen a country). But the threat of heightened Arab-Israeli tension is immediate. This is the year of the Jordan Waters (and the US elections). There could hardly be a worse time to throw down the gauntlet to the Arabs, and have them react against our Israel policy.

5. Despite Butler’s claim of a UAR/YAR/Soviet link, we see the UAR as wanting to limit the Soviet presence in Yemen (for its own reasons). But the UK proposals could force the UAR to let the Soviets come in big. Then where’s Aden?

In sum the Brits can’t have thought through their proposals. They’d stand to gain us nothing but trouble. And this to bail out a lame duck cabinet whose policy might get reversed come October.

What to do? Unless we turn the UK off hard, I’m afraid we’ll get whipsawed. Talbot proposes a gentlemen’s agreement to pursue divergent lines for the moment. But I fear that their policy will inevitably rub off on us. Wheelus is, after all, another base like Aden. And if the Brits join the Israelis in sniping at our policy, the pressure may get out of hand. So the best defense may be a strong attack. And let’s toss in counterproposals:

1. If the President is willing (the Brits are obviously trying to see if he’s an easier mark than Kennedy here), let’s tell Butler we flatly disagree, and LBJ wants to take the case to Home. This will raise the level from Rusk/Butler (Rusk’s NEA people are in despair).

2. Diplomatic approach to Nasser suggesting UK will call off dogs in Yemen, if Nasser will lay off Aden.

3. Agree to back demilitarization of south Yemen border area, if and only if UK agrees in return not to raise hell in UN.

4. Make clear we don’t want a fight with Nasser while Arab-Israeli issue hot.

5. Tell Brits we’ll bite back if they start attacking our ME policy.

RWK

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Meetings with Butler, 4/64. Secret.
2. For a memorandum of conversation recording Rusk’s April 27 discussion with Foreign Secretary Butler, see Document 55.