Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

287. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, April 6, 1967.

USG ASSURANCES AND ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS SAUDI ARABIA IN LIGHT CURRENT SAUDI-UAR CONFRONTATION

Development of US Policy Assurances

The body of our assurances to Saudi Arabia has grown gradually. As early as 1943 the Saudis sought US backing in their rivalry with the Hashemites of Jordan and Iraq. Our first explicit statements of interest in the Saudi security were made in response to Saudi concern, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, relative to Israel. It was against this background that President Truman wrote King Abdul Aziz on October 31, 1950 that aggression against Saudi Arabia would be a matter of “immediate concern” to the US.²

When, in the late 1950s, the UAR became the main threat to Saudi security, the SAG again turned to us for reassurance. With the advent of the Kennedy administration and the onset of the Yemen war, our commitments were directed at stimulating the Saudis to attain specific goals. These were: a) to encourage the SAG along the path of internal reform and development; b) to secure Saudi disengagement from Yemen; and c) to deter UAR attack and prevent the Saudis from taking actions which might provoke the UAR. As an inducement for Saudi cooperation in settling the Yemen civil war, Ambassador Bunker was authorized to offer Faisal a pledge of US military support in the event of aggression.

The Bunker proposal was the high-water mark of our assurances to the Saudis. Because of the SAG’s failure to sever its ties with the Yemeni royalists and Nasser’s refusal to withdraw his troops from Yemen, the Bunker offer of a military guarantee never went into effect. Our experience in the emplacement of a squadron of USAF fighters in Saudi Arabia during the second half of 1963 (Operation Hard Surface) brought home to us the difficulties involved in the stationing of an Amerian fighting force on Saudi soil. The restrictive rules of engagement placed upon Hard Surface in the interest of avoiding involvement in hostilities with the UAR left American pilots almost defenseless in certain situations and gave the Saudis the impression our planes were running away from the Egyptians.

The close of the Bunker effort witnessed an attempt to define our assurances more precisely, as fears grew that we might become drawn into the Yemen conflict by an overly-aggressive stance on the part of the Saudis. Faisal was informed repeatedly in 1964, 1965 and 1966 that we would support him in case of “unprovoked attack” but would not serve as a shield behind which the Saudis could stimulate hostilities in Yemen. It was also suggested to Faisal that if UAR attack were to occur or appear imminent he take the matter to the UN.

Nature of Our Assurances

With the exception of the abortive Bunker proposal, we have never given the Saudis a specific promise of military help against an attack. Our assurances have been conveyed by Presidents and Secretaries of State in private meetings with Saudi leaders, in written and oral messages, and in Departmental instructions and public statements (see attached listing).³ They have ranged from very general statements of interest in Saudi Arabia’s “well being” to fairly specific declarations of “full United States support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia’s integrity” (Kennedy letter October 25, 1962).⁴ Some mention of our interest in or concern for Saudi security is contained in almost all the several dozen letters exchanged with the Saudi rulers by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.

Our assurances to the Saudis have never been submitted for Congressional consideration and cannot be construed to be a formal US defense commitment. They have been sufficiently vaguely worded to allow us to interpret our response according to the circumstances. In practical terms, however, these statements do constitute a commitment, though of a purposely ill-defined nature. Our contingency planning has stressed diplomatic action to forestall and arrest a UAR-Saudi conflict. US military intervention (except to evacuate American citizens) has been contemplated only in the most extreme circumstances when we might consider our fundamental interests directly threatened.

US Interests and Programs

Saudi Arabia is important to the United States as a source of oil for free world use, a site of sizeable American investments, a growing market for American merchandise and a transit area for US military aircraft and forces. US exports to the Kingdom amounted to $138.7 million in 1966, as opposed to imports from Saudi Arabia of $95 million. The Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) alone has a fixed investment of more than one billion dollars in Saudi Arabia. Its operations contribute significantly to our balance of payments. Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf oil producers furnish about 60 percent of our petroleum requirements for Vietnam and East Asia (80 percent in the case of aviation gas).

Since before World War II, the House of Saud has been one of our best friends in the Middle East. The Saudis have turned a deaf ear to repeated Soviet overtures for diplomatic and trade relations and have staunchly opposed Communist penetration of the Peninsula. A violent overthrow of the monarchy would, in all likelihood, destroy our position of primacy in Saudi Arabia and open the door to the establishment of Communist bloc presence and influence. A revolution would probably not deny us Saudi oil (any government would be dependent on oil revenues) but could jeopardize our investments and make the terms of access to oil less favorable.

Our interest in the security and stability of the Saudi monarchy has been given expression through a variety of USG programs:

a. US Military Training Mission: The 235-man USMTM was first established in 1951 pursuant to an agreement with the SAG. The MTM is supported by an approximately one million dollar yearly MAP grant which in addition finances training in the US for approximately 100 Saudi officers yearly. Until recently the MTM effort was located primarily in Dhahran, but now more officers are regularly quartered in Riyadh. With the Yemen war, the need to preserve a distinction between training advice and assistance in combat operations has become important. We have taken the position that teams of up to 5 MTM officers may visit the border areas for short stays, on prior approval of the Ambassador and Washington concurrence as to timing.

b. Military Sales: Our last MAP arms grant program for Saudi Arabia was completed in 1962. Since that time we have sought to respond to Saudi requests for legitimate defense needs through sales programs, assisted when necessary by MAP credit or credit guarantees. Current major military sales programs are the $121.5 million Hawk missile contract signed by the SAG with the Raytheon Company in May 1966 and the $120 million Mobility Modernization Agreement signed by Secretary McNamara and Prince Sultan in August-September 1966. Some ten Raytheon American civilians are now in Jizan helping the Saudis to establish an operational Hawk missile site there.

c. Corps of Engineers Construction: The Army Corps of Engineers has undertaken on a reimbursable basis to contract for and supervise construction of military cantonments ($140 million) and a television network ($22 million). The Corps also supervises the Mobility Modernization Program.

d. Efforts to Promote Economic Development: We have underway a variety of programs in the civilian field (all on a reimbursable basis) to assist the Saudis in economic development. Chief among these are: a US Geological Survey mineral exploration and mapping project, our November 1965 agreement with the SAG to assist in the construction of a desalting-electric power plant at Jidda, assistance in agriculture, and the supplying of technical experts for specific projects.

Saudi-UAR Rivalry a Quasi-Permanent Factor

The Saudi-UAR conflict has been a major element on the Near Eastern scene for almost ten years, since the Iraqi revolution removed the Hashemites as serious rivals to the House of Saud. Hostility between the Saudis and the UAR has flared over Yemen and could intensify with the struggle for supremacy in South Arabia. A multitude of other factors, however, are equally or more important: the personal contest between Faisal and Nasser for leadership in the Arab and Muslim world, incompatibility between the UAR’s radical Arab socialism and the conservative Saudi monarchy with its commitment to capitalism, and a fundamental historical rivalry between Egypt, the focus of present day Arab culture and civilization, and Saudi Arabia, the site of the Muslim holy places. Though we may expect periods of detente, underlying differences between Riyadh and Cairo are likely to be with us as long as the regimes which now rule those two capitals remain in power. Where the US stands between the two Near Eastern rivals will continue to be a major problem in our relations with each as well as with other Governments in the area.

The Saudis place considerable reliance on us and have sought to involve us more actively in their defense. The assurances and assistance we have given have permitted us to exercise some restraint on the SAG’s actions in Yemen and encourage Faisal along the path of reform and development. While there may in the past have been some tendency within the SAG to over-estimate the extent of our commitment (and possibly a temptation to use our assurances to provoke a showdown with the UAR) the limited nature of our assurances has been made clear to Faisal. Our refusal of the Saudi Defense Minister’s request, following the January 27 UAR bombing of Najran, for the dispatch of US Army Hawk SAM units caused some disillusionment within the SAG.⁵ While this may be salutary to some extent, Saudi disenchantment limits our leverage with the SAG and has reportedly prompted the growth of a “go it alone” philosophy in SAG councils.

Our interest in Saudi Arabia’s security has been made almost as clear in Cairo as in Riyadh and Jidda. There is evidence that the UAR is attentive to the signals we send out. While our statements of support for the SAG have not prevented the Egyptians from occasional bombing of Saudi villages in the Yemen border area, they have probably helped deter the UAR from larger-scale actions. Our open backing of the Saudis probably heightens Nasser’s antagonism toward Faisal and strengthens his determination to overthrow the SAG by subversion. However, any indication of a lessening of US support for the SAG under present circumstances would probably encourage the UAR to step up its military and subversive activities against Saudi Arabia.

Courses of Action

Our long-term aim should be a Saudi Arabia friendly to the West but sufficiently strong internally and externally to stand by itself short of full-scale aggression by a larger power. Achievement of this goal may take a decade or more. During this developmental period protection of our economic and political interests in Saudi Arabia will require continuing US support for the SAG’s security and integrity.

Our concern over the stability of the Saudi regime should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that US and Saudi interests are not invariably identical or of the dangers of undue US military involvement in Saudi defense. At the same time, the UAR should remain aware that we intend to fulfill our commitment to assist the Saudis, by military means if all others fail. This policy will require walking a very fine line between friendship and support of the SAG and over-identification with the Saudis which could be as dangerous to us as to themselves. It will necessitate a degree of fence-straddling which is bound to create occasional dissatisfaction in Riyadh without winning us any real favor in Cairo.

Recommended actions toward this goal are:

a. Diplomatic action to forestall or arrest a Saudi-UAR conflict. While direct recourse to the UN Security Council may not be advisable, we should encourage the SAG to communicate directly to the President of the Security Council the facts of any new UAR attack on Saudi territory, for prompt circulation to Security Council members.

b. Military training activities, through USMTM and CONUS training of Saudi officers be maintained at about their current level over the next few years. A fundamental distinction should be made between USMTM’s training and advisory role in standard training areas as opposed to areas of potential hostilities. Anything which might tend to promote a permanent or quasi-permanent USMTM presence in the sensitive Yemen border area should be avoided. Guidelines contained in State 166314 (attached)⁶ for USMTM travel to the Yemen border area should be kept under review, although significant relaxation of border area travel restrictions is unlikely to be possible in the immediate future.

c. SAG purchases of US military equipment should continue to be consummated when legitimately required for the Saudi defense. MAP credit or credit guarantees should continue to be made available for certain items or programs. This relatively inexpensive form of assistance permits us to demonstrate our interest in Saudi Arabia’s security and helps ward off pressure for more direct USG action.

d. Saudi internal reforms and development programs should be encouraged with particular emphasis on the implementation of Faisal’s promise to establish local government councils.

e. New USG assurances, even the reiteration of past statements, should be avoided or at least clearly limited to cases of unprovoked attack.

f. Token US military forces should not be ordered to Saudi soil unless it is previously determined that such units will be backed by all necessary force in the event of hostilities. Our unsatisfactory experience with Operation Hard Surface (July 1963-January 1964) demonstrated that, without prior assurance of backing, the dispatch of token forces risks involving us in hostilities for which we are unprepared or, alternatively, raising doubts about the credibility of our deterrent.

g. Mindful of the pitfalls described in subparagraph f above, be prepared to recognize a long-range need to strengthen our naval presence in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea area to improve our diplomatic leverage and enhance our ability to make good, if necessary, on existing assurances to the Saudis. One possible course might be to augment COMIDEASTFOR from its current force level of two destroyers. A more numerous US Red Sea-Arabian Sea squadron would enable us to react rapidly to any SAG requests for help without the need to station vulnerable forces on Saudi soil. It is recommended that the IRG request DOD and the Department of the Navy to prepare plans on a contingency basis for such increases in US naval strength.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 4/1/66-12/31/67. Secret. Drafted in NEA’s Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden Affairs. The paper was apparently prepared for discussion at the IRG/NEA meeting on April 12.
2. For text of President Truman’s letter to King Saud, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, pp. 1190–1191.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. For text of President Kennedy’s letter to Crown Prince Faisal, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 88.
5. See the Yemen compilation for documentation on the U.S. response to the UAR bombing of Najran.
6. Attached but not printed; a copy of telegram 166314 to Jidda, March 31, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-SAUD.