286. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
Jidda, February 20, 1967,
0625Z.
3373. Para 4c Cairo’s 4649.2
- 1.
- From time to time King Faisal has said to me that he needed clear indication USG position in event Saudi Arabia attacked to enable him make adequate contingency arrangements. Prince Sultan has also occasionally stated that if USG unable or unwilling help SAG, Saudis will have to look elsewhere. In making such statements to me, neither King nor Sultan has ever specified turn to Soviets. However, I am told by UK Ambassador that in making similar statements to him, Sultan has once or twice spoken of turning to Soviets if necessary. Both UK Ambassador and I are inclined dismiss this kind of a statement as typical “Sultanism” without great deal of meaning. Sultan has occasionally spoken of UAR urgings Saudis could obtain Soviet arms more cheaply.
- 2.
- In recent call on me by Saudi Ambassador in Ankara, he claimed Soviet Ambassador to Turkey has in past two months or so called on him several times to indicate USSR would like to have better relations with SAG. Soviet Ambassador allegedly deplored Saudi anti-Soviet policies and fact that no diplomatic relations exist between two countries. Soviet Ambassador also told Saudi Ambassador that in present circumstance USSR will support UAR as needed. Understand similar approach has been made during past year by Soviet Ambassador in Paris to Saudi Ambassador there. I assume Saudi Ambassadors have reported this kind of nibble to Riyadh, but no suggestion to date Saudis are biting.
- 3.
- Faisal’s deep concern with spread of Soviet influence in Near East and concomitant Islamic solidarity policy which he considers to be a barrier against Commie inroads have until now shaped his area policy. We see no present signs of any change in Faisal’s strong anti-Soviet stand. As long as he remains on the throne, we believe chances are good that SAG will wish to keep Soviets at arm’s length. However, while no Saudis have specifically so stated to us, we have no doubt that there are Saudis who believe that closer relations with Soviets may be desirable, perhaps as some sort of protective unbrella or as means obtaining cheaper arms. At such time as Faisal goes, we would certainly [Page 546] not exclude possibility that a successor regime might wish to explore possible advantage of closer relations with Soviets.
Eilts