Office of the Historian

263. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington, March 17, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • Provision of Fighter Aircraft to Saudi Arabia

Discussion:

1.
In my memorandum of March 12 (Tab B)2 I apprised you of a note received from the British Embassy on that day informing us of the U.K. decision to provide Saudi Arabia with certain fighter aircraft to be manned by British pilots, and of their subsequent readiness, if required, to move in an RAF squadron of Lightning supersonic interceptors for a short period.3 They noted that the possibility of military operations could not be ruled out and sought our assurance on an urgent basis that the United States would come to the aid of Saudi Arabia if that country were attacked.
2.
We understand from Embassy Jidda that the Saudis are apparently satisfied with the offer to supply a limited number of fighter [Page 502] aircraft and civilian pilots at an early date and that the provision of an RAF squadron no longer seems required.
3.
We have also learned from London (telegram at Tab C)4 that British decisions to assist the Saudis and to query us concerning our intentions of honoring our commitment to the Saudis were made by the Cabinet. Foreign Office experts tend to feel it is unrealistic to expect a clear reply from us regarding our commitment since so many hypothetical factors are involved. We therefore anticipate the British Embassy will not press us on this matter. Nonetheless, the Ministers have not rescinded their request for a response from us, and in the circumstances we believe it desirable to reply to the original letter.
4.
There is attached (Tab A) a proposed response to the British5 expressing our concern over the effects of introducing RAF units into Saudi Arabia at this time or the employment of British subjects to fly Saudi aircraft which might be engaged in combat operations, and stating that our commitment to the Saudis does not extend to protecting them in hostilities arising from their provocatory actions.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the attached letter to the British Ambassador.

and if:

2. Ambassador Dean raises this subject during his call on you at 3 p.m. March 17 that you respond along the lines of the attached letter.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Moore and Korn; cleared by Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs J. Harold Shullaw, Meyers, Colonel Byrd, and Symmes.↩
  2. None of the tabs is attached. A copy of Hare’s March 12 memorandum to the Secretary is ibid. In it, Hare states that the British offer was in response to a request from Sultan, and that, according to the British, the decision was an effort to ensure successful conclusion of the arrangement to sell Lightning MK IIIs under the US/UK Joint Air Defense Proposal.↩
  3. Telegram 520 to Jidda, March 12, reported that when in London recently Sultan had requested that the U.K. Government supply an RAF fighter squadron to fly under Saudi colors if fighting resumed in Yemen. In response to a discouraging reply, Sultan asked that the United Kingdom supply Lightning aircraft urgently, even without crews, and strongly hinted that conclusion of the previously negotiated Lightning sale depended on U.K. readiness to comply. (Ibid., DEF 1-4 SAUD)↩
  4. Telegram 4324 from London, March 14, is ibid.↩
  5. See Document 264.↩