Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, August 2, 1968, 2350Z.

214602. Subject: Bahrein. Ref: Tehran 5903.²

1. FYI. We believe it would be preferable have British continue take lead in attempting resolve problem of Iranian claim to Bahrein. As you know, Ambassador Wright has instructions to probe Shah’s intentions and desires (CA-9741).³ We understand he has requested audience with Shah for next few days. We see real risks in our becoming involved in terms of our relations with all parties to dispute. We also do not wish undercut British efforts find solution. We believe preferable for us remain on sidelines urging parties be flexible in interest finding permanent solution.

2. In this context our pursuing idea of ICJ role in solving dispute appears inadvisable. In addition it is highly unlikely using ICJ to promote solution would be feasible. Statute of court provides that only states may be parties in cases before court. Acceptance Bahrein in such role would have direct implication concerning issue to be litigated, i.e., Iran’s claim to sovereignty over island. While Iran would thus presumably prefer UK as adversary, believe we must be particularly careful not to stimulate Shah in this direction since question what UK might be willing consider obviously highly sensitive. While UK has accepted compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ (Article 36(2) of Statute of ICJ annexed to UN Charter) Iran has not and (in absence special agreement with UK for reference this case to court) would be required to do so in order to proceed against UK. Should Iran go this route UK could conceivably find itself in court, but UK in all probability would argue it not a party to dispute and Bahrein would insist UK take such a position. Bahrein would in any case not accept a court decision on Bahrein in which Bahrein not consulted. End FYI.

3. In light foregoing you should inform Shah we believe best way to handle Bahrein problem is by continuing discussions with British and that we doubtful that ICJ can play role in dispute. You might wish brief Ambassador Wright on this exchange.

4. Re Security Council consideration, you should continue as appropriate discourage any Iranian ideas that resort SC would be helpful. It our view public debate problem of this nature, in which parties tend state positions in extreme terms, likely make solution more, rather than less, difficult.

5. Ansary has not mentioned ICJ possibility in meetings with Department officials since his return although he had opportunity during brief discussion on FAA and Bahrein with Under Secretary Rostow, July 30.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 BAHRAINIS. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eliot; cleared in draft by Brewer, Wehmeyer, Assistant Legal Adviser for UN Affairs Herbert K. Reis, and Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty-Jane Jones; and approved by Rockwell.
2. In telegram 5903 from Tehran, July 30, Ambassador Meyer reported that during a July 29 discussion of Bahrain Island, the Shah suggested taking the issue either to the UN Security Council or to the International Court of Justice. Meyer said he tried to discourage the Security Council action, and secured the Shah’s approval of having U.S. legal experts determine the feasibility of seeking an ICJ opinion. (Ibid.)
3. Dated July 29. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 5967 from Tehran, August 5, Meyer responded that although he shared the Department’s view that the U.S. Government should not get involved, he hoped that some face-saving device regarding Bahrain could be provided to the Shah before December. (Ibid.)