Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968

86. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, February 17, 1968, 1212Z.

1675. Subject: Jarring Mission. Ref: State 117236.²

1. I saw Mohamed Riad at 12:30 today (Feb 17). Noted I was acting under instructions which had been sent me after Dept had had opportunity study report of last FonMin-Jarring conversation (Cairo’s 1641).³

2. Recalled efforts which USG was making, in accordance its pledge, lend fullest support to Jarring Mission. This connection, we had urged Israel inform Jarring that it “accepted” Nov 22 SC resolution.

3. Matters had now developed to point where USG had two questions to put to GUAR: (A) did GUAR accept Nov 22 resolution and (B) assuming that both UAR and Israel accepted resolution, how did UAR envisage next steps?

4. As to first question, I pointed out to Mohamed that resolution must be taken as a whole. He was more aware than was I of discussion and travail which had gone into drafting of resolution and its ultimate unanimous adoption by SC. Third para of resolution had two very important words: “agreement,” and “accepted solution.”

5. It followed there was direct and unbreakable link between two questions I had put to him. If UAR in fact accepted resolution, it should also be prepared to take practical steps required to reach agreement and an accepted solution.

6. In all frankness, nothing which had so far appeared in UAR’s reports of FonMin-Jarring conversations indicated that GUAR had so far gone this required distance. FonMin had not been explicit as to next steps. Moreover, some of his comments to the effect that vague unilateral declarations or mere citations in a report that Jarring might write would take care of problem of belligerency fell far short of requirements of para 3 of SC resolution.

7. I noted that some UAR diplomats abroad had intimated that negotiations in Cyprus under so-called “Bunche formula” would be acceptable to GUAR. FonMin, however, did not appear yet to have crossed that bridge.

8. It was essential, if US were to be in position to make most effective use of its influence with parties, that we have clear answers to questions I had posed.

9. Mohamed took careful notes and said although he felt he was in position reply to my questions, he preferred not to do so until he could discuss them with FonMin and give an answer in latter’s name. He promised get in touch with me before he departs with FonMin on North African trip Feb 20.

Bergus

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis.
2. Telegram 117236, February 17, instructed Bergus to meet with Mohamed Riad to discuss the November 22 resolution. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1641 from Cairo, February 15, Bergus referred to some new nuances in the UAR position he had gleaned from telegrams received from the Department and USUN. He noted that Jarring was expected back in Cairo and he planned to discuss the UAR position with Mohamed Riad after Jarring’s meeting with the Foreign Minister. (Ibid.)