58. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to President Johnson1
Washington, January 22, 1968, 4:40 p.m.
Mr. President:
Herewith Kosygin responds to your message:2
- —He will let us know later about ABM-ICBM’s;
- —He wants the U.S. and USSR to
join together to force a Middle East settlement, with special
emphasis on getting the Israelis to go back to their borders.
Despite the lack of balance in his position, I have a feeling we ought to
explore this a bit further.
[Page 123]
Attachment4
Copy of Moscow 2529 from Ambassador Thompson, Jan. 22, 1968
Ref: State 102228.5
- 1.
- I saw Kosygin at 11:30 a.m. today and delivered message per
reference telegram.
- 2.
- Kosygin said the Soviets would study message and express their
views later. However, he could make a few preliminary
comments.
- 3.
- Re the NPT, Kosygin said the
Soviets are also gratified with the progress achieved. They had done
everything to expedite a solution of the outstanding issues and
believed the NPT should be signed as
soon as possible. Thus, on this question, the Soviet and US views
coincided.
- 4.
- Re strategic weapon systems, Kosygin said the Soviets are still
studying the problem. They would also study points made in the
President’s message and give their views later.
- 5.
- Turning to the Middle East, Kosygin asserted everything depended
on US and the President. There was, of course, a UN resolution in existence. When he
talked with the President, such questions as opening of canal,
recognition of Israel, and Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territories had been discussed. As regards Soviet aid, he wished to
point out that the Soviets never rendered assistance to aggressor,
always to victim of aggression. One could not equate Arabs and
Israelis, since the Israelis had launched aggression. The Middle
East problem could be solved easily if the occupied territories were
vacated by the aggressors. Kosygin said he felt that time had come
for the US and USSR to join their
efforts to achieve Israeli withdrawal. This could be done through
various contacts and through joint pressure on Israel. Jarring mission was, of course,
proceeding, but he was concerned it was becoming a routine
operation. If US and Soviets did what he was suggesting, the canal
could be opened and other elements of the problem resolved. His
impression was that some people in the US wanted the Middle East
tension to continue. While he did not want to mention any names, the
Soviets did have some information about attitudes in the US. Thus,
Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories was required. The US
and USSR should join their efforts
to this end, and he wanted me to convey this to the President.
Kosygin continued that the Soviets are very concerned about the
Middle East situation. On the other hand, while saying it did not
want continued tension in the area, the US is doing nothing about
removing it. For example, the US did not seem to be concerned about
the plight of Arab refugees. If roots of [Page 124] conflict were removed, i.e., if the problem of
occupied territories were resolved, other things, including the
question of armaments, would fall in place. What the US was raising
were subordinate questions, although Soviets knew that US is helping
Israel.
- 6.
- I said I would inform President of Kosygin’s remarks. Noting that
origins of present situation are well known, I said I saw no need to
discuss them again at this time. Stressing our concern about the
situation, however, I pointed out the President’s restraint in his
discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister was an effort to help
the Jarring mission and
implementation of UN resolution so
that a successful solution of the problem could be achieved. I also
pointed out that the problem involved not only question of occupied
territories, but also status of Israel, refugees, etc.
- 7.
- Kosygin concluded the conversation by repeating that if the
question of occupied territories were resolved, i.e., if troops
returned to their original positions, the whole problem could be
settled.
