350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
6853. 1. Jarring said he assumed the UN Secretariat has informed Department of his reports of his recent round of consultations. He did give me in writing the following excerpt from the paper the Israelis had given him for Jordan which he said contained the gist of the document: “Having accepted Resolution 242 for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, we are ready to enter into discussions with Jordan under your auspices in an effort to achieve mutual agreement on ways [Page 691] to implement it. The resolution, being not self-executing, should be subject for discussion and agreement between the parties. This is a legitimate and affirmative formulation, fully consistent with international law and national rights. The essence of our position is that only things that are agreed can be implemented. This is the purpose and intention of Chapter 6 of the Charter as well as of the resolution itself as expressed in paragraph 3, para. on the boundary question. Israel’s position is that within the framework of peace, the cease-fire lines will be replaced by agreed, secure and recognized boundaries and the adequate disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with what is agreed between the parties. These boundary and security questions are open for negotiation in the context of a transition to a permanent peace which should have treaty form.”
2. Jarring said the Arabs at first read the word “replaced” to mean that Israelis would keep all territory they now hold. He assured them this not the case which Israelis confirmed to him. He did not think the document had advanced matters at all.
3. He also said that the exchanges through him between UAR and Israel while very long had in effect merely said the same old things.
4. On Secretary’s seven points Riad told Jarring that the leak in Paris had been unfortunate and had forced him to make his own position clear. Riad said he would reply in writing as requested but pointed out that in written document he would have to be more careful than he could be in an oral discussion. He cited Sharm el Shaikh as an example saying his reply would have to say that UAR could not accept a UN force there for an unlimited time. He would also demand similar arrangement for El Auja. In conversation with Jarring, however, Riad indicated that a fixed period of time for UN occupation of Sharm el Shaikh could be acceptable and under Jarring’s prodding indicated this might be for as long as 15 years. For the present I gathered he was not willing that the Israelis be informed of this.
5. Jarring thinks both Arabs and Israel will wait advent of new American administration before making any further moves. He thought Governor Scranton’s visit had been very useful.
6. Jarring was impressed with Sapir who he thought saw the problem realistically. Jarring is worried about the escalation between Israel and Jordan and the Israeli policy of four eyes for one.
7. Jarring met yesterday with Semenov and Kuznetsov who were interested in his report but appeared disinclined to discuss matters of substance. Jarring continues to think however that Soviets desire a solution and are pressing the Arabs.
8. Jarring did not think Soviets and Israelis were likely to reestablish relations soon. He said Israelis had repeatedly warned him that if he put forward his own plan his mission was finished. Jarring is thinking [Page 692] of sending a cable to the parties about January 10 proposing further talks but has not yet decided on where he would propose they be held.
9. My impression is that Jarring realizes patience is required and will give it another good try but will not go on indefinitely if no progress is made.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis.↩