Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, March 12, 1968, 0007Z.

128960. Ref: Amman 3570,² 3571,³ and 3648.⁴

1. We are pleased that the King now wishes to conclude negotiations as soon as possible. In order to conclude agreement, you are authorized inform GOJ as follows:

(a) USG will increase number of M48A1 tanks in our package from 88 to 100.

(b) We will increase number of 40 mm. self-propelled anti-aircraft from 4 to 24.

(c) We will increase number of quad .50 caliber anti-aircraft guns from 9 to 100.

2. We have no objection to Khammash’s proposal to scale down his undelivered ground force spare parts to a level of $2 million. JAA and DAO must decide what spares actually needed. Perhaps his purposes would be better served by cancelling out the undelivered spare parts in cases UBN, UBQ, UBS, UBU and reprogram these requirements within the ground force package now offered. Alternatively, if the JAA is in a good spare parts supply position, such requirements might be further delayed. In view heavy load of spares purchases (3 years level) under 1965 ground force agreement, we believe JAA may be “spare parts poor” and it would make good sense make new purchases of spares on the most minimum basis. By now JAA may have developed new usage factors which would enable Jordan make more economical use of funds available for military purchases.

3. In other respects package remains as previously described. With considerable difficulty we have increased the size of the package in an effort to reach prompt agreement. We cannot go further. We have also agreed to airlift some of the equipment on MAC weekly flights. We have not ruled out possibilities of additional airlifts but cost and transport would be a problem. We will also try to advance the delivery dates as much as possible. In this context, of course, we cannot even begin the process of procuring or rehabilitating the equipment until the Memorandum of Understanding and the Sales Agreement are signed and financial arrangements made. We are concerned that the longer the delay in concluding the agreement the greater risk of slippages in some of the items.

4. Instructions concerning the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding follow.

5. FYI. Although approval granted on political and psychological grounds for increased arms package itemized para 1, we are disturbed over high cost of 40 mm. SP AA’s. Before conveying to the Jordanians our approval of the additional 40 mm. AA’s, you should make strong effort persuade them to accept the 91 additional 50 cal. quad mount AA’s as adequate meet their AA requirements. If Jordanians remain unconvinced you may then, in your discretion, offer the additional 20 40 mm. SP AA’s. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton; cleared by Davies, and Katzenbach in substance; Schwartz of DOD/ISA was informed of the substance of the telegram; and approved by Battle.
2. See footnote 2, Document 95.
3. In telegram 3571 from Amman, February 24, the Embassy concluded that with some limited accommodation to Jordan’s military requests it would be possible to reach an agreement that would preempt Soviet efforts to supplant the United States as the principal source of arms for Jordan. The Embassy recommended increasing the number of tanks offered to 100 and meeting Jordan’s request for anti-aircraft guns. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)
4. Document 95.