503. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1

1985. Goldberg provided Caradon (UK) with US draft resolution (septel)2 November 4 which we made available earlier in day to King Hussein.3 Goldberg asked Caradon to communicate it urgently to his govt with a request for full support by UK. Goldberg informed Caradon we were asking AmEmb London to make similar demarche at high level to UK FonOff.

Draft resolution is being considered by Hussein with whom we expect to meet again on Sunday afternoon4 to receive his reactions. We believe prompt indication of UK support would be very helpful in tactical situation here and as latter part of this tel will indicate, our hope is Caradon will be in position to see King before us on Sunday to indicate his agreement with and support of resolution.

We believe this res has reasonable chance of getting cooperation of both sides with UN rep and should be well received by UK in light fact [Page 992] it based on formula expressed by Brown in GA general debate. Formulation used by Brown: “Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes, nor that a state should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of a war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel’s neighbors must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggressive designs, and an end to policies which are inconsistent with peace.”

Goldberg said he had emphasized to Hussein that this text designed to take account of stress King had placed on having principles in operative section of res and on need to refer to Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. UK has expressed similar view. He said he had not asked for Hussein’s reaction, since he considered it unfair to ask for reaction on such short notice.

After reading text, Caradon said he warmly welcomed its general framework and layout, and its use of affirming language in operative section. He also said text GoldbeRG had given him was very close to text UKUN had itself worked out during past two days. He questioned whether res left adequate role for UN to play. Goldberg pointed out references to demilitarized zones and guarantees re freedom of navigation and solution refugee problem, all of which leave room for UN role. Went on to stress main thrust of res is to have UN express itself on essential points and designate UN representative whose job will be to get parties themselves to move as far as possible toward these points.

Caradon said UKUN would have preferred to include language re inadmissibility of territorial conquest by force. Goldberg said this would raise great problems with Israelis. Went on to stress “withdrawal from occupied territories” in present res would be bitter pill for Israelis to swallow and, thus, he not inclined make pill even more bitter.

Caradon raised point of most effective role UK might play at this point. Said he not sure it was to make text Goldberg had given him into joint US–UK text. Expressed view it might be best for him, assuming London’s reaction favorable, to inform Hussein that he (Caradon) had seen text prepared by US and that UK felt it contained essence of points UK supports; he could then urge that Hussein give it sympathetic consideration.

Goldberg indicated this would be most helpful and again expressed hope Caradon would get immediate reaction from London so that UK could speak to Hussein along above lines tomorrow afternoon before Goldberg calls on Hussein.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to London Immediate. Received on November 5 at 0022Z.
  2. Document 504.
  3. Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 5, reported the meeting with King Hussein on the afternoon of November 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)
  4. November 5.