Learn about the beta
Office of the Historian

502. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

1992. Goldberg brought Eban and Rafael (Israel) up to date on consultations of last few days.

1.
Kuznetsov-SecState:2 Very general and non-productive. Kuznetsov was told we were available to meet with him, but no contact as yet.
2.
Riad-Goldberg:3Riad appeared “insecure”. We are not sure how “wired in” he is and did not get too far with him.
3.
Hussein-Goldberg:4 King obviously wants to do business although his advisers may not. Goldberg reported to Eban that King had his Secretary read from minutes of Oct 17 Cairo agreement between King and Nasser, repeating in effect what Goldberg had told Caradon earlier re this meeting. (See USUN 1989.)5

Eban had received cable from Israeli Amb in London that King was saying similar things there, but with the addition that Israel should “restore June 4 situation”. Eban said this difference was crucial. Furthermore, there was no indication that other Arabs would even “nod [Page 989]assent”. Eban gathered that King thought only matter to negotiate was question of borders. This was clearly unrealistic.

In response Goldberg pointed out that he was not reporting to Eban something Hussein had said but what had been read to GoldbeRG from the minutes, and that what was read bears out Nasser-Anderson consultations.

Goldberg informed Eban that he had told King if King would take leadership for “Arabs” we would give him some of our ideas on res and would be in touch with him. At this point Rifai said that if we were unsuccessful, they would go to GA on LA res, “unchanged”.

Goldberg then set out problems of timing, noting that UK had been given definite instructions to vote either for revised Indian or Danish-Canadian text. Furthermore, they had instructions to make their views known and, if necessary, to table their own text. Although unwilling to show us their text even in confidence, in essence it was combination of Danish-Canadian (B) (USUN 1829)6 and revised Indian (1.) (USUN 1777).7Eban noted that was exactly opposite of what UK had told him, and he would ask Wilson about it when he saw him early next week.

Goldberg said that if Caradon's combined res goes to SC, it would get all votes except US. If US blocks SC, the July LA res would be taken to GA.

In effort to avoid both these developments, US wanted to try out some ideas for a res. First version Goldberg read to Eban said in part:

“Considering that the time has come, in the context of respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence and right of every state in the area to live in peace and complete security from threats or acts of force, to move from the cease-fire to a state of just and lasting peace:

1. Accordingly requests the SYG:

(A) To designate a special rep to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with all the states concerned with a view to assisting them in working out a political solution to the problems of the withdrawal of all forces from territories occupied by them, the termination of the state or claim of belligerence, the guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, the ensuring of secure and recognized frontiers, the just settlement of the refugee question, the guarantee of territorial inviolability in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones, and the limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area.”

[Page 990]

Goldberg viewed this as non-prejudicial to both sides since formulation does not settle matter but merely identifies problems of which SYG's rep would assist parties in working out “political solution”. Eban rejected this version commenting in particular on phrase “withdrawal of all forces from territories occupied by them,” and absence of “within a context of peace,” and criticizing order of presentation.

Goldberg then gave Eban second US trial version, reported septel (USUN 1988).8 Surprisingly, Eban and Rafael preferred this version to first version (which would have been more difficult to get Arab agreement on) Eban said he liked it. Was, however, concerned with fact that sequence in “affirms” para illogical and would tend to encourage working first on withdrawal, and subsequently on termination of claims of belligerence, recognition, etc. Pedersen and Sisco explained this was a linked para and modalities of sequence would be one of things to be worked out. Eban reiterated GOI would find res distasteful because (1) no direct negotiations; (2) withdrawal clause was first in sequence; and (3) “political solution” instead of peace “agreement”.

Goldberg told Eban he might be able to get British support for this res. Eban was doubtful, implying Caradon was not just recipient of instructions but influenced their tenor to some extent by nature of his reporting.

Goldberg recommended that privately Israel should stay out of things for a while, this is US initiative. Sisco asked Eban what he thought of US sponsorship, noting advantage that US could then supply interpretation. Eban said in some respects it would be a disadvantage since US could work better behind scenes if it were not the sponsor. However, US res would not be viewed in Israel as retreat if approach was that res based on five points of LBJ's June 19 speech. Goldberg concluded that best sponsorship would be SC Pres, on behalf of SC, or as SC consensus.

In response to Eban's request, “mutual acknowledgment and respect for the right of every state in the area, etc.,” of “affirms” para was changed to “mutual recognition and respect,” and, in same para, “secure and recognized borders” was changed to “secure and recognized boundaries.”

In subsequent telcons Rafael also sought deletion of words “in achievement of” in the “affirms” para and of “agreed” before solutions. Late in evening also called to say Eban wished him to make clear to us [Page 991]again that Israel would not be considered “subscriber nor co-sponsor” of the text.

Comment: Nature of Eban's comments and attitude was one of acquiescence.9

Goldberg
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Tel Aviv. Received at 0401Z.
  2. See Document 499.
  3. Telegram 1972 from USUN, November 4, reported a meeting on November 3 between Goldberg and Foreign Minster Riad. Sisco, who was also present, told Riad that according to a preliminary report from Anderson, Nasser had suggested three steps: (1) adoption of a Security Council resolution containing the President's five points; (2) appointment by the Secretary-General of one or more individuals to talk to the Arabs and Israelis, after which a declaration would be drawn up; and (3) submission of the declaration to the Security Council for ratification. Riad said he did not have any report in these terms. He was ready to accept the President's five points provided that they were given the “right interpretation”; a reference to territorial integrity and political independence should mean that Israel had no right to territorial gains and must withdraw from territories occupied. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)
  4. See Document 501.
  5. Telegram 1989 from USUN, November 5, reported a conversation between Goldberg and Caradon on the morning of November 4. Goldberg told Caradon that U.S. representatives had begun a new effort based on UAR and Jordanian intimations that they preferred dealing directly with the United States rather than through the Russians. He told Caradon of his meeting the previous day with King Hussein and said that the United States planned to develop language to submit to the King. He asked Caradon to refrain over the weekend (November 4–5) from making British views known in order to give the United States a chance to work something out. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)
  6. Telegram 1829 from USUN, October 29, conveyed the text of a possible compromise resolution prepared by Pederson and a Canadian representative based on the Danish-Canadian resolution and the modified Indian draft. (Ibid.)
  7. Not found.
  8. Document 504.
  9. Goldberg told Rusk in a telephone conversation at 1:37 p.m. that he had just finished talking to Eban and had a text which he could present to the King. He thought it was “not bad; they moved a little bit.” (Notes of telephone conversation prepared in Rusk's office, November 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)