Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State ¹

Prague, November 18, 1968, 1630Z.

4235. Ref: State 272356.² Subject: Gold/Claims.

1. At a reception November 14 CODEL Gore/Pell Ambassador Trhlik of FonMin proposed time had come “to exchange papers” on gold/claims, particularly since Czech May 2 note³ had not been answered by US. He said “Russians who are looking over our shoulder” had taxed Czechs with being remiss in not pressing for return of gold while at same time US was developing relations through increasing number of visits both ways. I replied Czechs need have no fear of inability to show they had more than defended their interests, and possibly to their detriment by refusing to consider a reasonable increase in payment of nationalization claims.

2. Trhlik did not refer as did Pribyl to supposition that US was ready to offer proposal on August 21 but said he assumed gold/claims question had lost priority among matters receiving US attention. I said this was probably so because of transition taking place between US administrations. I pointed out this was occurring in orderly fashion whereas Czech Government itself seemed to be victim not only of transition but disruption brought about by outside forces. Trhlik then said he assumed that no action on US Government’s part likely before at least early next year and I agreed this was a probability.

3. Jaromir Balcar, Stalinist Vice President of Czech Chamber of Commerce, told me Cyrus Eaton, Jr. had informed him that chances of MFN restoration now more favorable in view of US popular sympathy for Czechoslovakia and he asked me whether this was correct. I replied I strongly doubted validity of this assumption, saying that while our admiration and sympathy were undiminished, MFN was more likely to be tied politically to resolution of the Viet-Nam war in which Czechoslovakia had aided our enemies, but all of us should of course work for early peaceful conclusion.

4. Comment: Believe that on purely practical grounds Czechs should be strongly discouraged from pressing major econ-financial problems at this time although I would favor offering in due course new proposal along lines of that contemplated for presentation August 21, should local situation sort itself out in tolerable fashion. If only as debating point reference could in meantime be made on some occasion to ominous nature of Soviet interest described above.⁴

Beam

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels.
2. Telegram 272356, November 15, reported a Czech request to renew discussions on economic issues that remained outstanding between the two nations. (Ibid., E 4 CZECH–US)
3. The note was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A–500 from Prague, May 3. (Ibid., FN 19)
4. In telegram 291897 to Prague, December 24, the Department of State responded that the Soviet invasion had caused the United States to suspend a new proposal for settling the gold and claims issues and that the U.S. position would be considered again after the new year. (Ibid., FN 19 CZECH)