71. Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
Washington, July 23, 1968.
Here are Bill Lemnitzer’s answers to the two questions you raised with me yesterday.
The four major conclusions which emerge are:
- —Czech defection would weaken the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe—but probably not enough to justify reduction of current NATO forces.
- —Czech neutralization would justify some reduction in NATO force levels—dependent on our confidence that the Czechs would remain neutral in the event of war.
- —Forces for possible intervention in Czechoslovakia could involve 1 U.S. brigade, 2 French divisions, and 2 FRG divisions.
- —Employment of anything more than 1 brigade ought to be accompanied by NATO mobilization, which would require six months to reach planned force levels.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czechoslovakia, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret.↩